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Institutional Reform Shaming
Emily Chiang*
ABSTRACT

This Article introduces and explores the concept of institutional reform shaming, which is the public revelation of a failure to comply with
a social norm with the intent of generating structural change. Although
litigators have long used shaming as a tool for reform, they have typically done so reflexively and with little attention to the nuances and protocols of true reform shaming. At the same time, institutional reform litigation is itself in great need of innovation. The popular perception that
such lawsuits are filed by out of touch and elite lawyers on behalf of irresponsible and unsympathetic clients is reflected in an increasingly restrictive civil procedure, legislative and judicial attitudes, and the
academic commentary, which is now more interested in new governance
and collaborative problem solving than in unwieldy old-school class actions. Previously, litigators had responded to this cultural narrative with a
legal one, invoking only doctrine and rights. However, institutional reform shaming provides them with the cultural counter-narrative they
need. Traditional litigation will always be necessary if new governance
is to work; it is the stick that prompts institutions to collaborate. Reform
shaming can breathe new life into this work by reviving and strengthening litigation's role in governance, while embodying contemporary ideals
by driving defendants to the bargaining table.
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INTRODUCTION

Reformers have long used shame to bring defendants and policymakers to the bargaining table with strategies designed to reveal rights
violations and to create public pressure. They carefully select their
named plaintiffs and other faces of the cause, issue press releases to raise
awareness, and craft complaints intended to educate both the courts and
the public. And yet, the process by which shaming works-and by extension, can be made more effective-has been little studied in the context of institutional reform litigation. 1 This Article fills that gap. It iden-

1. Cf Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (1979) ("[S]tructural reform is in large part distinguished
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tifies reform shaming as a form of social norm enforcement wholly distinct from traditional shaming, designed to generate structural change
with its own protocols and nuances, and it begins the process of constructing a meaningful paradigm for its successful implementation.
This topic is particularly significant now because institutional reform litigation is both beset by changing social and judicial attitudes towards the traditional tools of such litigation, such as the structural injunction, and is no longer the darling of structural reform commentators. 2
Although reform litigation has a long and venerable history and is in no
danger of disappearing, it is in great need of rejuvenation. Reformers
have failed to respond adequately to the dominant cultural narrative attacking litigation as driven by lawyer elites and their irresponsible clients, offering only a rights-based narrative that many find unpersuasive.
Additionally, much of the recent scholarship in this area has focused on
developments that represent a shift toward a so-called "new governance,"
one that emphasizes cooperation and multilateral solutions to social
problems.3 This Article argues that the continued vitality of institutional
reform litigation is essential to the success of new governance and that
reform shaming offers a much-needed way to breathe new life into this
type of litigation.
Understanding how institutional reform shaming works and improving its efficacy provides practitioners with a powerful cultural narrative
of their own. It has been decades since Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss
first identified and described the public law litigation model, which was
then a novel shift from the traditional two-party litigation model. 4 Nearly forty years later, a new paradigm of structural reform is beginning to
emerge, one that is less judge-driven and even more multilateral than the
model it replaces. 5 But litigators have not sufficiently adapted to these
changed conditions, many of which are deeply rooted in sociocultural
by the effort to give meaning to constitutional values in the operation of large-scale organizations.").
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST.L.J. 323
passim (2009) [hereinafter When New Governance Fails]; Susan D. Carle, Progressive
Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times: Can New Models for Institutional SelfReform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 328

(2007); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fallof Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 344 (2005); Charles F. Sabel &
William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REv. 1015, 1016-19 (2004); Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism,98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 290 (1998).
4. Fiss, supra note 1, at 17-18; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976).
5. Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1994, 2009-10 (1999) (book review).
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developments, and if they continue to fail to adapt to the different constraints under which reform can be procured, they risk calcification or
worse, irrelevance. Similarly, there is an urgent need for the scholars
who write about this work to begin to reflect on how today's institutional
reform litigation can grow into tomorrow's.
Litigators already know their work constitutes just one of many
pressure points in today's structural reform projects. This Article explores how litigators can leverage the complex and dynamic relationship
between legal change and social change with consistent and conscious
use of reform shaming. The use of shame is by no means limited to the
litigation context, but this Article focuses on traditional institutional reform litigation because it largely has been left out of the new governance
conversation. Reform shaming in the course of traditional litigation offers an opportunity to implement the most powerful aspects of new governance theory within the strictures of real world reform.
Institutional reform shaming is the public revelation of a failure to
comply with social norms with the intent of generating change. It represents a third path toward the enforcement of desirable behavior, the first
two being traditional litigation (which focuses on the violation and enforcement of legal doctrine) and traditional shaming (which focuses on
the violation and enforcement of social norms by targeting particular individuals to make them feel bad about what they did). Rather than targeting particular individuals or actions, reform shaming focuses on institutional behavior; rather than seeking change at the personal level,
reform shaming seeks structural change; and rather than focusing on legal doctrine, reform shaming focuses on social norms that may or may
not overlap with doctrine.
Reform shaming's goals are also different from the two traditional
modes of behavior modification. Unlike traditional shaming, the initial
goal of reform shaming is merely regulatory compliance, regardless of
social norm buy-in. It is irrelevant whether changes to the institution are
made out of fear that a government contract will be canceled, concern
over shareholder dissatisfaction, or worry that individual administrators
will experience ostracism or other social consequences. Unlike traditional litigation, the ultimate goal of reform shaming extends far beyond
any one individual case or legal claim. Reform shaming seeks a wholesale cultural shift-via what some have called a cascade effect-across
social institutions towards one of regulatory compliance.6 This Article

6. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71, 77-79 (2001) (describing cascade effects as the result of the spread of information or reputational pressure that influences an individual to act in the same way as the
relevant group).
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contends that reform shaming makes not only one-time compliance more
likely, but also improves the chances that the long-term shift will take
place because it harnesses the irresistible forces of law, social norms, and
the market to funnel behavior in a more desirable direction.7
Reform shaming also provides litigators with a powerful tool to
close the gap between legal doctrine and social norms, producing reform
by recognizing the gap rather than denying its existence. Where the letter of the law may not strictly provide for relief, reform shaming can
make relief more likely by underscoring the deeply held social norms at
stake. Appealing to such norms may not be sufficient to prevail at trial,
but is often enough to bring defendants to the bargaining table where
agreements to make structural adjustments to policies and practices are
perhaps even more valuable than a favorable verdict. The gap between
law and relief sought was traditionally closed by the structural injunction
and the deep involvement of a judge committed to the cause. 8 These injunctions have become less palatable, the expansive model of judging
has fallen out of vogue, and doctrinal hurdles have proliferated. 9 Reform
shaming offers an alternative path, one that provides the added leverage
that reformers need to procure not just the constitutional minimum, but
true institutional change.
Reform shaming works because it exploits a quintessential human
emotion to incentivize defendants to implement change and, in so doing,
embodies much of what is so appealing about new governance. Although it takes place within the construct of the legal process and thus retains the potential for a top-down imposed judgment, reform shaming is
designed at heart to bring defendants to the negotiating table and to enter
into a multilateral problem-solving conversation. It does so by leveraging rational self-interest (the desire to avoid being shamed) and introducing a new cost (the financial and emotional costs of being shamed) for
institutional administrators and policymakers who might otherwise be
inclined to violate rights because doing so saves money.
The use of this technique may not be appropriate in every instance.
It should be avoided, for example, in cases involving deep moral disagreement. 10 However, it is well-suited for cases in which one or more of
the following is true: (1) a lack of moral disagreement about the core so7. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662-63
(1998) (identifying these forces, along with physical constraint, as the "sum of forces that
guide an individual to behave, or act, in a given way").
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. Cf Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and InstitutionalDesign, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 875, 973 (2003) (describing "hard cases," which typically implicate moral controversy such as abortion or gay rights, as opposed to "big cases," which tend to be more
administrative in nature, such as electoral redistricting or school desegregation).
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cial norms that have been violated, e.g., one should not mistreat children
or the elderly; (2) a vulnerable affected population or plaintiff class, e.g.,
the unwell, or those who cannot care for themselves; (3) a gap between
what the law requires and the desired structural changes; and (4) an
amorphous problem difficult to resolve by judicial fiat, e.g., mass incarceration.
This Article will synthesize the literature on shaming and the enforcement of social norms in other contexts, such as behavioral economics, criminal and corporate law, and international human rights; identify
what reformers on the ground are already doing to create and exploit
shaming dynamics; and explore concrete and specific ways in which institutional reformers can better leverage shame to achieve their goals.
The goal is two-fold: to gain a better understanding of reform shaming
and then to use that understanding to revive institutional reform litigation.
Part I of this Article describes the history of the role of litigation in
institutional reform. Part II of the Article explores the concept of shaming as a tool for reform and examines the arguments for and against
shaming in this context. Part III provides reformers with general guidelines on the successful use of shame, grounded in the literature and studies on how and when shaming is most effective. Finally, Part IV describes concrete ways in which litigators can use shame more effectively
throughout every stage of litigation, from the filing of a complaint
through post-case resolution.
I.

THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: LITIGATION'S RISE, DECLINE,
AND RISE

As others have noted, the Brown v. Board of Educationl" model of
institutional reform-sprawling and lengthy court and injunctioncentered relief-is in decline.' 2 However, as long as there are institutions in our society that serve the poor and disadvantaged, there will be a
need for institutional reform. It is unclear what the new reform era will
look like, although it will likely have many "new governance" characteristics, i.e., it will be less judge-centered, more experimentalist, and more

11.
12.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
See, e.g., Emily Chiang, Reviving the DeclaratoryJudgment: A New Path to

Structural Reform, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 549 (2015); Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L.
Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insightsfrom Theory and Practice,36 FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 603, 607 (2009) (describing a decline in public interest reform in the 1980s and 90s
fueled by a more conservative judiciary, decentralization and deregulation, and procedural and financial constraints).

2015]

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM SHAMING

multilateral. 3 The goal of this Article is not so much to describe the new
era, but rather to focus reformers on how they can leverage this period of
transition and shape it to their advantage with the tools they have at hand.
To that end, this Part will lay out the essential characteristics of the new
era, beginning with its historical basis and focusing particularly on the
role of litigation in reform.
The role and need for litigation in institutional reform has been hotly contested in the academic commentary, which provides us with a distinct narrative arc: the golden age of litigated structural reform, a dyspeptic era in which litigation is merely a "hollow hope," followed by the
resurrection of litigation as one tool of many driving change. Peter
Schuck describes "strong-court" scholars, "court skeptics", and "court
fatalists, 1 4 but this Article might most accurately be described as "court
pragmatist." It contends that litigation has always been and will always
be an integral part of structural reform. Both litigators and the reformers
working alongside them have largely understood that litigation is often
necessary but rarely sufficient.
This position does not deny the changes that have occurred over the
last several decades in structural reform campaigns. Rather, it recognizes
that the general litigation environment is what has changed, not the lawyers: judges have become more conservative, low-hanging fruit has already been picked, and the popular and legal culture has become more
resistant to structural reform. 15 The need for reform remains, and the clients are still largely unsympathetic and powerless, which means litigators
now more than ever must step up. The remainder of this Article is part
of a larger project designed to help them do so within the constraints of
the new rules of the game.16
A. Brown and Its Aftermath
The first wave of institutional reform scholarship focused on the litigation that took place in the years after Brown, as organizations such as
13. See, e.g., Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 3, at 346-47 (summarizing new
governance scholarship).
14. Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigationand Social Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763,
1769 (1993) (book review). See also id. at 1764 (noting that "most of the academic legal
commentary... is preoccupied, even obsessed, with the role of courts in legal reform")
(emphasis in original).
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. Although the focus of this particular Article is on the litigation response to the
new era of structural reform, others have described the necessary evolution of inonlitigative solutions, such as community organizing and protest. See, e.g., Tomiko BrownNagin, Does Protest Work?, 56 HowARD L.J. 721, 722-24 (2013); Scott L. Cummings &
Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalReflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443,
460-466 (2001).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:1

the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") tackled one social institution after another for overhaul with relative success.17 Litigation is central to this narrative and the role of the judge is, in turn, central
to the litigation. 18 Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss are the main storytellers here, and they describe a thrilling departure from the traditional, private, retrospective, bi-polar, and self-contained litigation model. 19 The
new public law litigation centers on multiple parties, prospective relief,
constant negotiation, and heavy reliance upon a judge willing to preside
over the entire complexity. 20 This scholarship does nothing less than relate the birth of a new legal enterprise: "structural reform." The project
it describes is as ambitious as it is bold, focusing not on individual incidents or wrongs, "but rather upon the conditions of social life and the
role that large-scale organizations play in determining those conditions. 21
Structural reform is almost inconceivable without structural reform
litigation. It is the courts that take charge of "reconstruct[ing] social reality" in the aftermath of Brown by wholly restructuring large-scale or22
It is judges who are charged with giving meaning to the
ganizations.
.
24
23
Constitution. The preferred tool of reform is the structural injunction,
which eventually extends far beyond school systems, to address the
needs of prisons, mental hospitals, welfare administration, and eventually
the state bureaucracy writ large. 25 As Fiss explains, the injunction
"speaks to the future," and it is this prospective quality, combined with
the power it vests in the judge that explains its preeminent role in structural reform.26 In this account of public law litigation, judges and courts
heroically wield the structural injunction on behalf of the poor and the
vulnerable. After the injunction is issued, the litigation itself becomes a
17. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-84 (1978) (proscribing the use of
torture in prisons); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (concluding that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment"); Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that prisoners have a fundamental right to access the
courts, and prisons must provide prisoners with materials, such as a library, in order to
exercise that right). See also Fiss, supra note 1, at 4.
18. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1077 (1984)
(describing the "guiding presence of the judge").
19. Chayes, supra note 4, at 1284.
20. Id.
21. Fiss, supra note 1, at 18.
22. Id.at 2.
23. Id. at 9. See also id. at 14 (describing "adjudication as the process through
which that meaning is revealed or elaborated").
24. Id.at 23.
25. Id.at 4.
26. Fiss, supra note 1, at 23.
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parable for society, which can look to the story of the case to derive new
social norms, such as the wrongfulness of segregation or torture in prisons.
B. The "Hollow Hope"
The backlash to this model of practice was swift and encompassed
sociopolitical culture, legal doctrine as generated by the courts, and the
academic commentary. A mere five years after documenting the rise of
the new litigation in 1976, Chayes wrote again in 1982 to describe
"countertendencies" that had begun to emerge by the mid-1970s.27
These events included both academic opposition and the bulk of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Together, they formed the basis for a
counter-narrative to the story-which was itself a counter-narrative to
traditional litigation. Cultural commentators opined as to the failure of
plaintiffs in these cases to accept personal responsibility for their actions,
depicting both them and their legal counsel as opportunists instead of
victims and their saviors.2 8 Where the judges and the courts once battled
to restore meaning to the Constitution, the counter-narrative instead described judicial and court incompetence, over-reaching of constitutional
boundaries, and-perhaps most critically-an inability to procure real
and meaningful change. At its heart, the counter-narrative disputed the
idea that judges were any more well equipped to generate or enforce social norms than any other social institution or collective.
Doctrinally speaking, a well-documented increase on limits to those
seeking structural relief accompanied the replacement of the Warren
Court with the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 29 There is no question that
the bench is more hostile to structural reform claims now than it has been
in the past, 30 but the legal, political, and social culture is also increasingly

27. Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV.
4, 7 (1982).
28. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
29. Members of the Court sometimes openly expressed antipathy to structural reform. Justice Powell stated in UnitedStates v. Richardson, for example, that "we risk a
progressive impairment of the effectiveness of the federal courts if their limited resources
are diverted increasingly from their historic role to the resolution of public-interest suits
brought by litigants who cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all citizens... It merits noting how often and how unequivocally the Court has expressed its
antipathy to efforts to convert the Judiciary into an open forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the performance of government." 418 U.S. 166, 192
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
30. Others have noted the inherent and/or increasing conservatism (with a small
"c") of the bench. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L.
REv. 941, 949 (2011) (noting that "judges face political pressure to stay within the mainstream").
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skeptical of wholesale court-driven reform efforts.31 As others have noted, apart from the personnel changes on the Court, Congress has also
acted to limit reform, as through the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996.32 Moreover, there is increasing reliance on alternatives to litigation and the use of non-lawyers to provide legal information, and social
attitudes about poverty and poor people have also changed. 33 This attitudinal and doctrinal shift, described so ably by Chayes in 1982, remains
little changed today. Although structural reform is in no danger of disappearing, there is no question that it is more difficult to procure and
more dependent upon the discretion and disposition of the judge than in
its (short-lived) prime.34
The decline in the traditional model of structural reform was mirrored in the scholarship. Some of the commentary alleged the inherent
unsuitability of the courts as vehicles for reform, 35 but another strain of
the scholarship came from within and targeted the use of litigation to
drive reform as ineffective or even counterproductive. 36 Gerald Rosenberg's classic book, The Hollow Hope, catalogs the various pitfalls and
shortcomings of litigated reform, which often results in false victories
while diverting much needed resources from more effective political
campaigns for change.37 Rosenberg's account of Brown diverges sharply
from that of Chayes and Fiss, as he describes the Court as a largely inef31. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60
L. REv. 2027, 2037-40 (2008) (describing how the "growing conservatism of the
country and the courts" has affected public interest legal work); Ann Southworth, What is
Public Interest Law? Empirical Perspectives on an Old Question, 62 DEPAUL L. REv.
493, 498-99 (2013) (describing attorney perceptions of increasing reluctance of courts to
find and enforce civil rights).
32. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-140, 110 Stat. 1321, 1366-70
(1996); John Valery White, Foreword: Is Civil Rights Law Dead?, 63 LA. L. REv. 609,
636 (2003).
33. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century:
Achieving Equal Justicefor All, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 369, 371 (1999).
34. Cf. John V. White, supra note 32, at 632 ("Today civil rights law seems more a
system of equitable remedies for extreme and outrageous government action.").
35. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 134 (1970) (criticizing federal judges who "view themselves as holding roving
commissions as problem solvers and as charged with a duty to act when majoritarian institutions do not").
36. See e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 16-19 (1996) (arguing that the Court is fundamentally
majoritarian, not a haven of refuge for minorities, and that Brown had almost no immediate direct impact on desegregation); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth To Power: The
Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 807 (1995) (describing an "ironic consequence for civil rights lawyers who shallowly frame social problems as narrowly
conceived legal problems," whereby litigation becomes the "sole, or at least primary,
remedy sought" and diverts scarce resources from the client community).
37. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 340, 423-24 (2d ed. 2008).
STAN.
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fectual bit player (in contrast to the results oriented 1964 Civil Rights
Act) instead of the epicenter of a heroic victory.38 Stuart Scheingold
similarly urges reformers to focus on the politics of rights, as opposed to
the myth of rights.3 9 Others have suggested more charitably that litigation often has unforeseen costs. It is expensive and can be prolonged,
particularly where defendants do not immediately concede; reformers are
often out-gunned by defendants with far superior resources; and when
defeat does come (as it occasionally must), it can "sap movement morale,
undercut its bargaining power, and exhaust its resources. 4 °
But there remains a place for litigated reform. Rosenberg could not
have predicted in 2008 the tidal wave of court rulings in favor of marriage equality, rulings that have resulted in truly substantive victories at
both the federal and state levels, and victories that stem from litigated reform. 41 Brown and its aftermath teach us that, if nothing else, court victories must either be rooted in widely shared social norms or nurture the
development of such norms in order to produce meaningful change.42
Rosenberg failed to predict the rapidity with which social norms on marriage equality would develop-and once they did develop, litigation was
vital to the protection of the right. And litigation built on strong norms
foundations will continue to be essential in the cases that define institutional reform today, those that involve fundamentally forgotten populations and that are not characterized by great moral debate, i.e., the big
cases, as opposed to the hard ones on which Rosenberg focuses, where
litigated reform is needed precisely because there will never be any political will to fix the problem.
C. Litigators andthe Politicsof Rights
Although some have argued otherwise, structural reform litigation is
far from dead.43 Litigation will always have a role to play in systemic
38. Id. at 46-54; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
39. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 5, 84 (2d ed. 2004) (defining the myth of rights as being "premised on a direct linking of litigation, rights, and remedies with social change" and the politics of rights as "a conception of rights as political resources").
40. Michael W. McCann, Social Movements and the Mobilization of Law, in So-

CIAL MOVEMENTS

AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 201, 208 (Anne N. Costain et

al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Mobilization ofLaw].
41. Compare ROSENBERG, supra note 37, at 415 ("The foregoing analysis shows
that litigation as a means of obtaining the right to same-sex marriage has not succeeded."), with United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding the Defense
of Marriage Act's non-recognition of state same-sex marriages unconstitutional).
42. Cf ROSENBERG, supra note 37, at 82 (describing the importance of social and
cultural constraints) and 107-56 (denying Brown any role in creating a norm cascade effect). See also infra Part III.B.3 (describing norm creation and cascade effects).
43. John V. White, supra note 32, at 635.
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reform, 44 and much of the above criticism failed to recognize what public
interest lawyers have always known: that the role of litigation in public
interest reform is multifaceted, flexible, and dynamic-and that it extends far beyond the courthouse. 45 Litigators can only do so much.
Someone needs to litigate the cases and they do so with the understanding that others must do their part as well, because litigation is a full-time
job and because they are trained as lawyers, not lobbyists or community
organizers. Sometimes these actors are all in the same office (more on
that later), but sometimes they are not. More recent scholarship recognizes these essential facts of cause lawyering, the reputation of which
appears largely to have been rehabilitated. 46 The remainder of this Section will discuss the most salient aspects of the new (old) role of litigation in structural reform, beginning with the premise that it remains necessary to achieving structural reform. It will further contend that these
defining features stem largely from the fact that reformers recognize they
cannot rely exclusively upon the courts to restructure institutions.

44. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (noting that "under the conditions
of modem government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances"). See also Cummings & Rhode, supra note
12, at 648 ("Courts may not always be the most effective dispute resolution forums, but
they are often the most accessible; they are open as of right and can force more economically or politically powerful parties to the bargaining table."); RICHARD ABEL, Speaking
Law to Power: Occasionsfor Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 69, 95 (1998) (noting that "the judicial forum is particularly attractive to the powerless ...because courts must hear every
claim and give reasons for their decisions") (emphasis in original); Marc Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95, 135 (1974) (noting the "flavor of equality" litigation has, making it particularly appealing for "have-nots").
45. There is also literature on the effects litigation can have on social movements.
See, e.g., McCann, Mobilization of Law, supra note 40, at 205, 208 (discussing the phenomenon of "consciousness raising" and legal catalysis); Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public Interest Law, 7 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 483, 490 (1984) (noting that rights secured for one group can affect the
litigation efforts for others); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS: CHILD WELFARE
LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (2000) (undertaking case study of child welfare

reform in Illinois and concluding that litigation played critical role in its success).
46. Cf Rhode, supranote 31, at 2028 ("Contrary to critics' frequent claims, the organizational leaders profiled here have been acutely aware of the limits of litigation in
securing social change."); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 3 (2004) ("Cause lawyers

thus emerge as political actors-but as political actors whose work involves doing law.
Just as politics animates their legal work, that work disciplines the kinds of politics that
they can do.").
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1. New Governance & Old-School Litigation
There are powerful arguments in favor of the continued need for
structural reform litigation as a tactic for change, particularly when
wielded on behalf of the disadvantaged because, without resort to the law
and the ostensible neutrality and power of the justice system, the poor
and oppressed have little ability to procure meaningful relief.47 This Section will focus on the continued need for this type of litigation even in
the face of what has often been presented as a true alternative: new governance. Others have argued that the methodologies suggested by new
governance are insufficient to achieve true structural reform. 48 This Article will focus on adapting systemic reform litigation to serve its role in
systemic reform more effectively in a new governance world. As the political, legal, and social culture moves towards new governance, so too
must cause lawyering.
New governance is everywhere and embraced by those across the
political spectrum. 49 As one commentator aptly expresses, perhaps it
presents a "great relief-a new era of constructive engagement, mutual
problem solving, and searching for win-win solutions is upon us.' 50
Douglas NeJaime's summary of this phenomenon is inclusive and useful:
new governance responds to the "rights-based, state-centered, top-down
litigative and regulatory strategies by turning toward experimental, flexible, collaborative public-private partnerships and by locating lawyers as
problem solvers rather than as traditional advocates." 51 Orly Lobel similarly characterizes the phenomenon as one in which reformers rely on
"new public/private partnerships, . . . next generation policy strategies
such as negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-

47. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness & Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wisc. L. REv. 1359 (1985); MICHAEL
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILI-

ZATION

(1994).

48. See Chiang, supra note 12, at 550. See also NeJaime, When New Governance
Fails, supra note 3, at 327.
49. See, e.g., NeJaime, When New Governance Fails,supra note 3, at 343-44 (noting that new governance seems "decidedly centrist").
50. Carle, supra note 3, at 328.
51. NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, supra note 3, at 324-25. NeJaime
notes that the scholarship on new governance includes that on "democratic experimentalism, network governance, collaborative governance, associative democracy, negotiated
governance, and legal pragmatism." Id. at 325. See also Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra
note 3, at 344 (describing the replacement of "hierarchy and control with a more participatory and collaborative model, in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for achieving policy goals"); id. at 346-47 (providing an even more inclusive list
of the scholarly theories encompassed by new governance).
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solving, disclosure rebased rules, decentralized and dynamic problem
52
gimes, and coordinated information collection.,
Just as Chayes and Fiss presented public law litigation as the new
modem alternative to traditional dispute resolution, so too have new
governance proponents presented new governance as the liberated replacement for old-school structural reform litigation which, with its
messy and prolonged lawsuits, is outdated and antiquated.53 Lobel aptly
summarizes the challenges that regulation-and by extension old-school
litigated reform-face: it is often under-inclusive and ineffective, it is
sometimes over-inclusive, and it is subject to the equivalent of agency
capture by regulated interests.54 New governance proponents advocate
instead the methodologies of the future-multilateral, experimental, and
more temperamentally and aesthetically suited to our post-bowling
league era of digitization and short attention spans.55
Not all aspects of new governance are relevant to this project, but
two are particularly salient. The first is that which emphasizes the multiple ways in which reform may now be procured, absent the filing of a
traditional class action lawsuit. It emphasizes the ground-up and experimental quality of this reform and suggests that reform procured in this
manner is superior to that procured the old way, via court-issued mandate. 56 The second is that which seeks in part to re-characterize traditional litigation itself, with the idea that winning or losing is no longer
important (or perhaps never was), and that the judge is not the central
party, but rather just one participant in a dialog between the various
branches of government and policymakers.57
52. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supranote 3, at 345.
53. See, e.g., NeJaime, When New GovernanceFails, supra note 3, at 330 (noting
that "litigation, for some liberals and progressives, has become pass6 at best and suspect
at worst").
54. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supranote 3, at 363.
55. Cf id. at 357 (noting that much of new governance scholarship argues that "life
has reached a new degree of complexity which renders a central control-and-command
structure impossible").
56. See, e.g., Doff & Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, supra
note 3, at 290; Sabel & Simon, DestabilizationRights, supra note 3, at 1016-19 ("The
evolution of structural remedies in recent decades can be usefully stylized as a shift away
from command-and-controlinjunctive regulation toward experimentalist intervention....
In the most distinctive cases, the governing norms are general standards that express the
goals the parties are expected to achieve-that is, outputs rather than inputs.").
57. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REv. 477,
489-90 (2004) (describing research that indicates "the judge and judicial decision or judicial decree are not the epicenter of litigation from which all else radiates" resulting in
"lessened concern over winning and losing in court"); Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and
Future of CorrectionsLitigation, 132 U.PA. L. REv. 639, 655 (1993) (describing the interdependence of the courts, other branches of government, the media, and reformers).
See also infra Part I.C.2, regarding winning and losing. Although others have noted that
the doctrinal limits on structural reform have resulted paradoxically in an increase in ju-
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This Article argues that there is life left in old-school litigated reform, which can be revived and rejuvenated even in the shadow of new
governance. The question is not whether new governance is ill advised,
but what role traditional institutional reform litigation can and should
play in a world besotted with new governance. The question is whether
institutional reform litigation can acclimate to new governance priorities,
such as flexibility, adaptability, and tolerance for uncertainty as part of
an educative process of self-improvement.5 8
Others have criticized new governance from a cause lawyering perspective, focusing in particular on the professional identity of cause lawyers. They suggest, for example, that new governance ignores the skill
set strengths of these lawyers and that a commitment to new governance
principles may compromise the ability of these lawyers to turn later to
litigation.59 This perspective is extremely persuasive, but omits a more
crucial aspect of the dynamic between old-school systemic reform litigation and new governance: the latter simply cannot be successful without
the continued vitality of the former.
To the extent that new governance succeeds, it does so because of
the continued threat of the very old-school litigation it seeks to replace.
Structural reform litigation in the form of messy and prolonged class actions is not only necessary, but also a critical aspect of new governance,
even as that litigation has adopted some of the multilateral attributes of
new governance itself. New governance is not as much a paradigm shift
as it is a paradigm hedge: its continued existence rests upon the age old
foundation of the class action lawsuit-the lawsuit need not ever be filed,
but must remain a credible threat. Without the looming possibility of the
lawsuit, institutions have little external incentive to change, outsider
stakeholders will never be brought to the table, and the only experimental
solutions likely to be implemented are those that favor entrenched interests.
Second generation, non-litigative means of reforming institutions
hold promise where the institution is willing and capable. Susan Sturm,
for example, describes the use of change agents to work within an institution for "self-reform" in the context of what would otherwise have
been an equal protection and/or a Title VII claim. 60 The problem, of
course, is that the vast majority of institutions are unwilling to engage in
dicial discretion, which is used primarily to foreclose reform. John V. White, supra note
32, at 639.
58. Cf Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 3, at 367.
59. See, e.g., NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, supra note 3, at 350-53;
Carle, supra note 3, at 337-38.
60. Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in
HigherEducation, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249 (2006).
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this sort of process, opting instead for what Scheingold calls "legal evasion., 61 New governance typically emphasizes the importance of stakeholder participation in reform, both for the substantive input that these
parties can contribute to the policymaking process and for the resultant
benefits to civic and political life.62 As institutional reformers have long
recognized however, litigation is sometimes the only way in which certain types of stakeholders-namely, the disenfranchised, the poor, the
oppressed, and the despised--can get a seat at the table. Finally, litigation is a potent catalyst for change, often serving as a critical crisis for an
institution,63 without which it would be unable or unwilling to confront
the need for evolution. 64
This Article acknowledges the challenges posed by the conditions
necessitating new governance answers to age-old problems and contends
that institutional reform litigation can and must adapt to these conditions.
Doing so is critical not just for the stakeholders who would likely otherwise be left out of new governance altogether, but also for the eventual
success of new governance itself.
2. Winning Even in the Face of Loss
A significant amount of recent scholarship documents the benefits
of litigation for institutional change. Commentators have noted, for example, that it increases publicity for both causes and the organizations
advocating those causes, it can help to frame a cause and encourage discussion, it may increase access to resources, it reveals injustices, it mobilize allies, it builds a base for political reform, and it increases bargaining
power and the potency of other tactics. 65 Litigation has also been described as providing a crucial forum, particularly for minorities (whether
racial or otherwise) who have few other options for raising public aware-

61. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 39, at 119.
62. See, e.g., Lobel, The Renew Deal,supra note 3, at 374.
63. Cf.Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development, and
the Dynamics ofInstitutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 378 (2009).
64. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible
Courtsfor Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 410 (1990) ("Conflict generated
by rights claims and heightened by the media and community groups might push decisionmakers towards negotiation.").
65. See, e.g., JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 209-10
(1978); see also Michael W. McCann & Helena Silverstein, Social Movements and the
American State: Legal Mobilization as a Strategyfor Democratization, in A DIFFERENT
KIND OF STATE? POPULAR POWER AND DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION 134 (1993) (sug-

gesting that litigation's indirect benefits, such as revealing injustice and publicizing a
cause, are more important than its direct impact on reform); NeJaime, Winning Through
Losing, supra note 30, at 955; Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 57, at
560; Cummings & Rhode, supra note 12, at 606.
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ness about their problems and who benefit from the legitimacy conferred
even by failed litigation. 66
A distinct subset of this literature takes pains to emphasize the benefits inherent to litigation even in the face of loSS. 67 Stuart Scheingold, for
example, praises the politics (as opposed to the myth) of rights, in which
unfavorable decisions bring problems to light and activate constitueni
cies. 68 Ueo
Use of "rights"
in this manner treats the invocation of rights as a
means to a political end. 69 Douglas Nejaime has catalogued a variety of
internal and external benefits that inhere to litigation regardless of victory or loss,7 ° and Harold Koh suggests that the courts are merely participating in an ongoing dialog with the other branches of government.7 1
Jules Lobel contends that litigation may be used to enlist the courts as a
forum for protest, in which "courts not only function as adjudicators of
private disputes, or institutions that implement social reforms, but as areagitate for, and communicate,
nas where political and social movements
72
their legal and political agenda.
The view that winning is not essential even has traction with the
Court, which has noted that "unsuccessful suits allow the 'public airing
of disputed facts' . . . and raise matters of public concern., 73 Moreover,
the Court has noted that unsuccessful suits "also promote the evolution
of law by supporting the development of legal theories that may not gain
acceptance the first time around.",74 A common strain through this line of
reasoning is the idea that litigation itself can be a valuable player in the
marketplace of ideas and that the publicity gained for causes via litiga-

66. Yamamoto, supra note 64, at 407-08.
67. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 12, at 609 (describing a conception of litigation as seeking "political transformation, not doctrinal victory"). Cf McCann, Mobilization of Law, supra note 40, at 202 (noting that the "indirect and 'radiating' symbolic effects of official legal actions (e.g., by courts) often are far more important than their
direct, command-oriented effects").
68. SCHE1NGOLD, supra note 39, at 136-37.
69. Id. at 148.
70. NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, supra note 30, at 969 (noting that litigation
loss can help organizations stake out an identity, contribute to mobilization and fundraising via outrage and show need for continued activism, and shift attention and resources to
other policymakers); see also Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
817, 821 (2013).
71. Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights
Policy , 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2406 (1994) (arguing that "adverse Supreme Court decisions are no longer final stops, but only way stations, in the process of 'complex enforcement'); see also NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, supra note 30, at 967.
72. Lobel Courts as Forumsfor Protest, supra note 57, at 479.
73. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)).
74. Id.
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tion may benefit the cause regardless of whether the litigators actually
prevail in the courts.75
This glass half-full account of litigation loss is in many ways descriptively accurate: reformers will always make lemonade out of lemons. But this Article contends that court cases that result in litigation loss
were lost far before the motion to dismiss, the motion for summary
judgment, or the trial. They were lost as soon as plaintiffs failed to generate sufficient leverage (via motion practice and pre-trial discovery) to
drive defendants to the bargaining table. As Marc Galanter has noted,
cases in which defendants do not seek settlement are almost by definition
weaker cases, ones in which the facts and/or law against them are not as
strong.76 Lawyers and reformers must of course adjust their strategies in
the face of losses like these, but the political leverage generated by failed
litigation is second best, at best.
The real question for litigators and reformers is not how to make the
best of a bad situation when litigation fails, but how to maximize the effects of litigation leverage to drive meaningful settlement conversations.
Weak claims do not generate sufficient leverage and result in loss, but
not every worthwhile claim is doctrinally strong. 77 This Article argues
that the effective use of shaming can help to close the gap between weak
and strong claims, providing the extra leverage needed to produce settlement.
3. Getting to Yes
It has never been necessary to litigate a case through a full trial,
much less through an appeals process, to procure the structural reform
benefits litigation has to offer. The goal in the vast majority of this type
of litigation is to procure a settlement, using the leverage of litigation to
pressure defendants to come to the bargaining table.78 In the path of a
typical case, plaintiffs seek publicly available information via the Freedom of Information Act 79 ("FOIA") and its state equivalents, use that in75. See, e.g., Lobel, Courts as Forumsfor Protest,supra note 57, at 488 ("The educational value of litigation is often substantial even where the case does not result in a
legal victory."); RICHARD A.L. GAMBITTA, Litigation, Judicial Deference and Policy
Change, in GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 277 (Richard A. L. Gambitta et al. eds., 1981)

(noting that litigation loss can still "recast the nature of a debate" and "facilitate debates
that otherwise may not occur"); MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 47, at
70-71 (1994) (arguing that regardless of winning or losing, litigation can raise awareness
of an issue).
76. Galanter, supra note 44, at 101.
77. Cf John V. White, supra note 32, at 620 (illustrating the escalating nature of
claims).
78. See, e.g., McCann & Silverstein, supra note 65, at 137.
79. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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formation to generate a complaint that functions also as a public education document, issue a press release concurrently with the filing of the
complaint, and seek discovery. They, or another organization sharing the
same commitments, may also issue a report on the same topic and, if and
when a legislative solution becomes a possibility, retain a lobbyist to educate legislators on the importance of the cause. Sometimes, the litigation is filed on a relatively narrow issue and used as a wedge for reform
in a broader area. 80
Of particular note in this account of institutional reform litigation is
that the battle for reform proceeds on two fronts. The first is before the
presiding court, governed by the rules of civil procedure, and characterized by the filing of legal documents and participation in oral arguments
in which the ostensible goal is nothing short of a full legal victory. The
second is that in which this Article is more interested, where plaintiffs
seek to air as much of defendants' dirty laundry as possible to drive settlement and negotiation-and to ensure that their bargaining position in
settlement talks is the best that it can be.81 These two aspects of litigation are, of course, inextricably linked: court filings in the former serve
the interests of the latter, and statements to the media in the latter inevitably influence the former. Sitting at the nexus between these two aspects is shame. Understanding its operation in and relationship to both
realms can make settlement more likely and the resultant outcome more
conducive to true reform.
4. One Tool of Many
Finally, litigation in the modem era is characterized by its diminished status. No longer the sole or preeminent tool for reform, litigation
is still a necessary, but no longer sufficient, strategy for achieving social
change.2 Reform is now often explicitly multifaceted and multilateral,
sometimes described as "multidimensional advocacy., 83 Resources previously devoted solely to litigation are now often diverted to items like

80. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 330-31 (1988) (noting
that the triggering event for reform may be a single issue but that once it finds its way
into court, it may expand; and that the better the lawyer is at building a record, the broader the remedy that may be within reach).
81. See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights
and Poverty Practice,8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 477 (1999) (noting that lawyers use "litigation to influence their clients' relationships with other parties in more subtle ways, by
shaping the circumstances under which their clients negotiated for better outcomes").
82. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 12, at 605.
83. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas Nejaime, Lawyering for Marriage
Equality, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1235, 1242 (2010).
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relapublic education initiatives, communications consultants and public
84
tions employees, legislative outreach, and grassroots organization.
This development is echoed in the recent body of work that takes a
broader view of litigation than that which occurs in the courtroom, acknowledging that the judiciary can only do so much. 85 Scott Cummings
and Deborah Rhode, for example, emphasize interviews with public interest lawyers, in which the lawyers describe litigation objectives apart
from winning, such as "making a public record, raising awareness, or
imposing sufficient costs and delays that will force defendants to adopt
more socially responsible practices. 86 A study by Ann Southworth
makes similar claims, suggesting that lawyers are not using litigation
alone and are not interested in litigating to obtain favorable precedents.
Rather, lawyers are interested in obtaining results for their clients, are
aware of litigation's limits, and are also using overtly political strategies.87 Others similarly categorize these lawyers as "engaged political
edta
,,88
strategists" rather than "myopic technicians,' or contend that the real
point of litigation is to inspire political action as part of a larger campaign, 89 at least in part by generating bargaining power. 9
Of course, public interest law organizations have always used nonlegal tools to pursue their goals, 91 but several things have changed about
84. Structural reform litigation remains distinct from what is often referred to as
cause, or movement, lawyering, which also incorporates litigation as one tool of many.
There do not tend to be mass social movements around the interests and rights of institutionalized persons-in contrast to, say, gay marriage-largely because these people tend
to be unpopular, powerless and/or not particularly likeable.
85. Cf. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 39, at 118 (noting that the judiciary has only a
"modest reservoir of coercive resources").
86. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 12, at 611; see also Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling
Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REv. 881, 902 (2004) (describing the reinforcing effects
of litigation on ones allies).
87. Southworth, supra note 81, at 477; see also Rhode, supra note 31, at 2046 (describing a public interest lawyering environment in which litigation is both used more
selectively, in conjunction with other reform methods, and with lower expectations); Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allurements": A Relational
Analysis ofSocial Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261, 266 (1998) (describing
how cause lawyers view litigation as one tactic available, but also look to lobbying and
political mobilization).
88. Southworth, supra note 81, at 469.
89. Lobel Courts as Forumsfor Protest, supra note 57, at 480; see also id. ("Even
when public interest lawsuits prevail in court, often their most lasting legacy is not the
relief ordered by the court, but the lawsuit's contribution to the ongoing community discourse about an important public issue.").
90. NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, supra note 30, at 955.
91. Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 60 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds.,
1978); see also Galanter, supra note 44, at 143-44 (describing, in 1975, public interest
law as "a combination of community organizing, class action and test-case strategies").
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the practice. First, organizations faced more criticism in the past for engaging in extra-legal means of pressuring for reform. For example, when
the ACLU attempted to influence the public debate on an issue in 1923,
it was subject to criticism from Justice Frankfurther, who stated that cases "must be tried in the courts, not in the press, or in a publicity campaign.' ,92 In contrast, when another case brought by the ACLU made its
way to the Court in 1978, Justice Powell noted approvingly that, "the
ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression
and association,
as well as a means of communicating useful information
93
public.
the
to
Second, the sheer number of organizations engaged in explicitly
multidimensional advocacy has increased. A 2006 study on the organization of public interest law practice from 1975-2004 notes that in 1975,
22 percent of public interest law organizations expended no effort on research, education, or outreach; 94 in 2004, only 5 percent had expended no
such effort. The authors of the study suggest, "PILOs [public interest
law organizations]
have moved beyond litigation as the sole focus of so95
change.,
cial
Third, these organizations have engaged in a significant amount of
industry consolidation. Where litigators used to work in one office and
coordinate with community organizers in another, these functions are all
increasingly integrated under larger umbrella organizations. Just as public interest organizations have grown in size, so too have they grown in
function. The ACLU has a communications department dedicated to
media coverage of its cases, hires organizers, and issues public education
reports; 96 the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, School
of Law has a satellite office in Washington, D.C.; 97 and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund issues a variety of publications, not
just legal briefs.98 This industry consolidation is not without its disad92. David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 102-03 (1992) (citing
Letter from ACLU to the residents of Berrien County, Mich. (undated), in Felix Frankfurter Papers, Container 125 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)).
93. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,431 (1978).
94. Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organizationof Public Interest Practice: 1975-2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1612 (2006)
95. Id; see also Rhode, supra note 31, at 2028 (noting that reformers "have become
more selective in their use of lawsuits, and have focused more attention on multiple strategies including policy and public education"); id. at 2048 (presenting similar data).
96. See Press Room, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/press-room
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
97. See
Our
Mission,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE,
http://www,brennancenter.org/about (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
98. See Publications, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
http://www.naacpldf.org/publication-search (last visited January 8, 2015).
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vantages, one of the most important of which is judicial resistance.
Much of the perceived failure to coordinate litigation with other aspects
of campaigns for change in the past may in fact have been a savvy
recognition that the good cop (the organizers and lobbyists)/bad cop (the
litigators) routine works better if the two do not share a letterhead. 99

II.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM SHAMING

This Part will introduce the concept of institutional reform shaming
as a powerful tool for reformers (and litigators, specifically) to drive
structural reform without having to rely exclusively on the courts, even
in the context of active litigation. Additionally, it takes the new reform
era as a given, complete with its assorted inherent and situational constraints, and argues that true systemic reform has always required some
amount of institutional buy-in. As reflected by the increasing popularity
of new governance, meaningful and long-lasting change does not typically come from top-down or outsider-to-insider mandates. There are other
ways of producing institutional buy-in, as with strategic use of the declaratory judgment, but here the focus will be on maximizing the efficacy
of shaming as a reform strategy.10 0 Although reformers have always
used shame to achieve their goals, that use would benefit from the shaming research developed in other fields.
A. Reform Shame as Distinguishedfrom TraditionalShame
This Article is not about traditional shaming. Commentary in other
areas of the law, such as criminal law or international human rights, typically focuses on shame qua shame as a quintessential human emotion.
Reform shaming is interested instead in borrowing useful concepts from
traditional shaming to generate institutional change.
As such, the term "shame" is used expansively in this Article to refer to (1) the emotion associated with (2) negative judgment based upon
the (3) public revelation of (4) a failure to meet a particular standard.
The "emotion" may be experienced by a person, a group of people, a
government agency, or a corporate entity. Its sole outward manifestation
may be behavior modifications designed to avoid or to minimize the impending negative judgment. The judgment may or may not exist in reality, and may be imposed by the general public, one's peers, or other
groups. The revelation of failure must be made public, whether through
media coverage, the filing of litigation, or other external publication.
99. Cf Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95
CAL. L. REv. 1879, 1908-09 (2007) (describing judicial aversion to the coordinated use
of direct action, media advocacy, and litigation).
100. See Chiang, supra note 12, at 592-93.
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Lastly, the standard in question may be legal, moral, an internal corporate regulation, or some combination of these types of standards.
There are other, more finely tuned definitions of shame, but the
most essential components are the failure to meet a standard and the public revelation of that failure.101 In the literature on human psychology,
for example, shame is typically understood to refer to the feelings experienced when negatively evaluated, whether by oneself or by others, for
10 2
failing to meet standards regarding what is good, right, or appropriate.
John Braithwaite defines shaming in his book, Crime, Shame and Reintegration, as "all social processes of expressing disapproval which have
the intention or effect of invoking remorse in the person being shamed
03
and/or condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming."',
The definition used here also purposely elides the commonly made distinction between shame and guilt,'1 4 and indeed, many of the distinctions
typically made within the family of shame related emotions, such as embarrassment and humiliation.' 0 5 It is interested not so much in shame as
an internal emotion (e.g., when a child feels shame after violating a family rule) as it is in shame as reflected in outward behavioral changes (e.g.,
when an institution seeks to avoid public condemnation by modifying its
policies).
A number of commentators have lodged powerful criticisms against
traditional shaming, but this Article contends that reform shaming is a
101. ARNOLD H. Buss, SELF CONSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL ANXIETY 159 (1980); see
also Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American CriminalLaw, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1902 (1991) ("Shaming requires witnesses who will learn of the shameful act and
who will condemn it."); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposalfor Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365,
368 (1999) ("Shaming is the process by which citizens publicly and self-consciously
draw attention to the bad dispositions or actions of an offender, as a way of punishing
him for having those dispositions or engaging in those actions."); Richard A. Posner &
Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating andEnforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions,
19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 369, 371 (noting that "shame arises when other people find out
about [a] violation and think badly of the violator"); Martha C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM
HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 184 (2004) (defining shame as "a painful
emotion responding to a sense of failure to attain some ideal state").
102. THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH 210 (Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins & June Price Tangney eds., 2007).
103. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 100 (1989).

104. Compare, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 733, 766 (1998) (explaining that guilt may be preferable to shame by

prompting "the self to try to make amends for the wrongdoing" because it "preserves
some distance between the self and its wrongful act"), with Dan Markel, Are Shaming
Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implicationsfor the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2157, 2178 (2001) (commenting on the "public
dimension of shame and the private dimension of guilt").
105. Cf Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame Implicationsfor Legal Reform,
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 655 (1997) ("Shame is bordered by embarrassment,
humiliation, and mortification, in porous ways that are difficult to predict or contain.").
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wholly distinct phenomenon with particular benefits. Martha Nussbaum,
a prominent critic of the use of shaming and disgust in most settings, allows that "the normative situation of shame" is complicated, and depends
on the type of shame being used. 10 6 She singles out for praise certain
types of shame, such as that elicited by Barbara Ehrenreich's classic,
Nickeled and Dimed,10 7 discussing society's failure to provide adequate
support for the working class and poor.10 8 This good, or positive shame,
is characterized by three qualities: (1) its reliance on "morally good
norms... basic to the shared political conception of the United States";
(2) the fact that it is "antinarcissistic, reinforcing a sense of common human vulnerability"; and (3) the invitation to feel this shame is "noninsulting, nonhumiliating, and noncoercive."' 0 9 These qualities are, not coincidentally, the very same qualities that institutional reform shaming
strives to embody.
Institutional reform shaming seeks to leverage the publication of a
norms violation by an institution to induce reform by capitalizing on the
organizational equivalent of traditional shame, i.e., shame as experienced
by an organization or bureaucratic entity as opposed to a private individual. In so doing, it functions as a variant on a multilateral, costly sanction, or uses the fear of such a sanction, and a norms violator is punished
by many. 10 Expressed in game theoretic language, reform shaming's
goal is to make regulatory compliance a dominant strategy by use of disclosure and the threat of shame. In plain English, reform shaming seeks
to induce those who operate institutions like schools and prisons to comply with the law for fear of being shamed if they do not.
Reform shaming achieves this by taking advantage of what we have
learned about human behavior and psychology in the context of traditional shaming and norms compliance. In a nutshell, we tend to comply
with social norms because we are driven by the need for the good opinion or respect of those around us."' Judge Richard Posner identifies four
incentives to obey norms: advantage to oneself, emotional reasons, desire to avoid disapproval or ostracism, and norm internalization resulting
in shame or guilt. 112 Reform shaming seeks to enhance all four of these
incentives with the aid of publicly conducted litigation. It is critically
106. NUSSBAUM, supra note 101, at 176.
107. BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY INAMERICA

8 (2001).
108. NUSSBAUM, supra note 101, at 213-14.
109. Id.
110. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 101, at 372, 376.
11 .Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338, 355-57 (1997).
112. Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87
AM. ECON. REv. 365, 365-67 (1997).
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different from traditional shaming, however, in that it does not require
that the norms be fully internalized by the party who is shamed.
It does not matter very much whether the manager, director, or
agency head internalizes the norm-all that matters is that they comply
with the norm, even if for purely self-interested purposes, e.g., protection
of reputation. Where traditional shaming might envision an institution's
administrators being forced to wear shirts that say "We Violate the
Rights of Children" to punish shameful behavior, reform shaming aims
to enhance whatever feelings of shame offenders might experience, or
think the public thinks they should experience, to produce structural reform. Ideally, a cascade effect results, wherein other institutional administrators modify their behavior to comply with the1 1same
norms even in
3
the absence of litigation for fear of similar shaming.
B. The Argument for Shaming
Done properly, institutional reform shaming is a cost-effective and
constitutional means of enhancing the efficacy of institutional reform litigation. It has the additional benefit of providing a powerful counterweight to many of the traditional concerns raised by institutional reform
in that it enables and empowers defendants (as opposed to judges) to
drive the reform process by complying with widespread social norms.
Thus, the reform that results from reform shaming may be perceived as
more legitimate than court ordered changes, both because the changes
stem from deeply held and widely shared norms and because they will
often be defendant-driven. This Section will examine the primary advantages conferred by institutional reform shaming.
1. Obtaining and Improving the Quality of Reform
Shaming can make reform more likely and even improve the quality
of the reform obtained. In an essay penned forty years ago that continues
to ring true, Marc Galanter describes the institutional constraints that litigants seeking law reform face in an overloaded court system that treats
parties to litigation as if they were equally endowed with resources and
abilities and pressures everyone to settle in lieu of a full adjudication that
might result in a change to the existing rules. 1 4 Dominant parties, such
as the institutions charged with providing social services in America, are
endowed with a number of systemic advantages that "interlock, reinforc-

113. See, e.g., Sunstein, DeliberativeTrouble?, supra note 6 (describing cascade effects).
114. Galanter, supra note 44, at 119-22.
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ing and shielding one another."1 15 Although many of these institutional
advantages can be overcome with the influx of resources and capabilities
brought by repeat players like the ACLU, shaming is one way in which
the playing field can be leveled. Reform shaming is needed for the same
reasons institutional reform litigation is needed: less formal sanctions
are typically ineffective, particularly where the communities in question
are large and those engaged in the misbehavior have ample opportunity
16
to go elsewhere.'
Shaming works in part by reinforcing and harnessing existing cultural norms, e.g., that children should be treated more gently than adults,
or that the vulnerable should not be physically abused.'1 7 The act of publicizing the wrong, e.g., that children are being detained in inhumane
immigration detention conditions, 11 8 and indicating that it is shameworthy reinforces the strength of the norm both for the wrong-doers and
the general public." 9 Critically, it also underscores to other entities engaged in similar shame-worthy behavior that their actions may be in violation of social norms, incentivizing them to change their ways without
120
having to resort to additional litigation.
It is unimportant whether an institution "buys-in" or internalizes the
norm in question and, perhaps, many will not. In their study of the effectiveness of corporate shaming and adverse publicity, Brent Fisse and
John Braithwaite found that corporations engaged in reform for any
number of reasons, such as to shake off a journalist or nagging inspector,
or to elude prosecution. 12 1 But in every instance they examined, some
reform resulted, if for no other reason than to reduce the probability of
future recurrence. 22 And yet, this type of reform is still in keeping with
the new governance philosophy that self-imposed reform is more likely
to take root than reform mandated by a court because the substance of

115. Id. at 124.
116. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 91 (2000).

117. See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of norm shifting, or creation.
118. See, e.g., Bunikyte v. Chertoff, No. A-07-CA-164-SS, 2007 WL 1074070, *11
(W.D. Tex. 2007) (listing the poor living conditions at the Don T. Hutto Family Residential Center as, among other things, a lack of warm shower water, warm clothes, and adequate medical care for children at the center).
119. Cf AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY (THE LIMITS OF DIVERSITY)

37-47 (1999).
120. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE

OFFENDERS 235 (1983) (finding in the corporate context that "a scandal involving a few
companies in one country can ultimately result in reform in many companies in many
countries").
121. Id. at 244.
122. Id. at 233, 243-44.
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than the actors interpreting and imlegal judgments often matters
123 less
judgments.
those
plementing
Shaming is well suited to our post-structural injunction age of reform because it leverages rational self-interest into contributions to the
collective good. 124 It is often cheaper, from an economic perspective, either to violate civil rights or to permit conditions that make rights violations more likely to occur. Employee supervision and training, highquality materials, heating and air-conditioning all cost money. Reform
shaming increases the price of business by introducing a set of costs-in
the form of reputational injury or contract loss, for example-that institutional administrators otherwise have little incentive to take into account.
But beyond the application and reinforcement of existing norms, shaming can also stretch the bounds of reform, presenting reformers with an
opportunity to shift not just legal rules, but social culture itself. 125 As
discussed below, shaming can be used to close gaps between existing
doctrine and the desired reform by serving as an added source of pressure
for defendants to come to the bargaining table when plaintiffs' purely legal entitlements may not otherwise be sufficient.
Litigation, absent any shaming component, emphasizes the purely
legal aspect to the rights violation or wrong committed, but is less effective at solving the longer-term cultural problems-that these particular
victims are devalued or voiceless, that they have wrongly been deprived
of rights by virtue of their institutionalization, etc.' 26 Litigation with a
shaming component connects the perceived rules violation with a cultural norm violation, amplifying the legal claim by making the violation
more objectionable and of greater interest to the public and policymakers.
Producing and reproducing the shaming narrative serves not only
the practical and immediate effect of strengthening a particular client's
claim, but also offers a powerful counterweight to the broader social narrative opposed to structural reform and the traditional conservative critique of rights-based claims generally. Mary Ann Glendon, for example,
has persuasively argued that American culture is overly centered on
"rights talk," which has cultivated an illusion of absoluteness when it
comes to rights, privileged self-sufficiency over community, buried tradi-

123. See, e.g., Beth Harris, Representing Homeless Families: Repeat Player Implementation Strategies, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 911, 918 (1999).
124. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943,

996 (1995).
125. Cf Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to
Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 978 (1997) (describing factors that contrib-

ute to culture-shifting, as opposed to rule-shifting).
126. Cf id. at 985.
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tional concepts of responsibility toward others, and neglected our essential social nature to the detriment of civil society. 127 She and others depict plaintiffs in these types of cases as overly litigious, windfall-seekers
who have failed to take personal responsibility for their actions and who
8
are represented by greedy lawyers.12
The typical reform response to the cultural narrative Glendon offers
has been a purely legal response rather than a cultural one-responding,
in other words, to the criticism that there is too much focus on rights with
an increased focus on rights. The shame narrative contends, in contrast,
that it is not plaintiffs who have insufficiently accepted personal responsibility or neglected social norms, but rather defendants, who have done
wrong. The shame narrative provides plaintiffs in these lawsuits, who
are segregated from society by virtue of their institutionalization, with an
opportunity to reintegrate themselves into that society and its cultural and
social norms. It offers them a voice and a way to push back while still
operating within the conventions and constraints of traditional community.
2. Transparency in Democratic Self-Governance
From a normative perspective, the use of shaming in the institutional reform context is deeply related to the need for transparency in democratic government. 129 The idea is that publicity can motivate government
officials to behave appropriately and provide citizens with the information they need to make decisions-such as whether a particular government official should be voted out of office. As newspaperman and
publisher Joseph Pulitzer put it:
There is not a crime, there is not a dodge, there is not a trick, there is
not a swindle, there is not a vice which does not live by secrecy. Get
these things out in the open, describe them, attack them, ridicule them
in the press, and sooner or later public opinion will sweep them away.

127. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE passim (1991).
128. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 56-68 (2004) (summarizing the tort reform literature); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 262-64 (1994) (describing a

"new legalism" characterized by adversarialism and litigation over "the disappointments
of everyday life").
129. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 470
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949) (underscoring importance of transparency); Jeremy Bentham,
Of Publicity, in ESSAY ON POLITICAL TACTICS, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 310

(John Bowring ed., 1839) (same).
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but it is the one
Publicity may not be the only thing that is needed,
130
thing without which all other agencies will fail.
The type of behavior reform shaming seeks to target and reveal to the
public is precisely the type of behavior-much like corporate wrongdoing-that would likely otherwise go unnoticed.131
Moreover, it is behavior that primarily affects the politically powerless, (sometimes literally) disenfranchised, and frequently unsympathetic: the incarcerated, the mentally ill, the disabled, the very young, and
the very old. 132 In part as a result of the population served and the types
of services being provided, the operation of these institutions is often left
to peripheral state agencies or outsourced altogether to for-profit private
parties who may or may not be state actors. 133 It is particularly easy for
the institutions in question-alternative schools for troubled children, juvenile detention facilities, public defense systems, and the like-to fall
off the public's radar, so to speak. The parameters under which they operate are rarely subject to full and open debate and, even when they are,
neither the general public nor the state may see the need to care or intervene.
Reform shaming can also serve to reintegrate both the democratic
populace and the state in the operation of these critical institutions. As
Sameer Ashar notes in his case study of the campaign to reform working
conditions for restaurant workers in New York City, the campaign and
accompanying litigation served to "bring the state back" into the conver134
sation, and the state served as a critical "audience" for the campaign.
Reform shaming acts to link conditions within an institution to violations
of broader social norms and, in doing so, functions as a call to community members to take action by joining in the condemnation. There is no
shaming without publicity or the buy-in of the public and, because shaming is such a deeply rooted human behavior, the public writ large intuits
this dynamic and what is required of it.
3. Shaming as New Governance
Finally, reform shaming is a tactic that bridges new governance and
traditional litigation, amplifying and strengthening both. Traditional liti130. DAVID BOULTON, THE GREASE MACHINE 253 (Harper & Row, 1978).
131. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at 1-2.
132. Cf Sabel & Simon, DestabilizationRights, supra note 3, at 1064 (noting that
one premise of public law reform cases "involves majoritarian political control unresponsive to the interests of a vulnerable, stigmatized minority.").
133. See, e.g., Emily Chiang, No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking Section 1983
Liability in the Context of DisciplinaryAlternative Schools andBeyond, 60 BUFF L. REV.

615, 618-19 (2012).
134. Ashar, supra note 99, at 1917.
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gation will always have a role to play in governance, but it can borrow
from new governance concepts as it evolves. When used in the context
of traditional litigation and when executed with maximum effectiveness-as through use of concepts like reintegration and iterative playreform shaming is conducive to self-regulation and collaboration, and
leverages the interlocking nature of government, civil society, and the
market. 135 It provides potential defendants with the possibility of collaboration-both pre-filing and post-filing-and a way to avoid traditional
top-down, judge-imposed regulation. It also transforms the traditional
zero-sum, winner-takes-all dynamic that can pervade traditional litigation
and stand in the way of negotiated reform through settlement. Finally,
litigation with a reform-shaming component can also provide a counterweight to the traditional criticism of adversarial and legalistic approaches
to reform. 136

C. The Argument Against Shaming
For as long as shaming has existed, there have been arguments
against its use. The academic debate over the use of shaming lives largely in the criminal justice context regarding its appropriateness as a sanction and in the corporate context regarding its appropriateness as a deterrent or incentive to change behavior. Many of the objections have both
normative and technical aspects, both those that reject shaming regardless of efficacy and those that contend shaming can never work or will
inevitably result in misuse or abuse. The scholars who oppose shaming
are thoughtful, persuasive, and largely correct, at least with regard to
shaming in contexts other than the structural reform context. This Section will briefly examine the primary objections and explain why each is
largely inapt to the use of shaming to leverage structural reform.
1. Illiberal Shame
Perhaps the most significant and persuasive objection to shaming
stems from the eternal tension between the liberal and communitarian
states. This objection has two intersecting aspects, the first of which focuses on the effects of shaming on the individuals shamed and the second
of which focuses on the impropriety of the state's involvement in creating those effects. A number of commentators have noted that shaming is
inherently partisan, requiring society to pick sides and "aligning itself
with those who subscribe to norms that give pride of place to community
135. Cf Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 3, at 375 (describing the state, market,
and civil society as "part of one comprehensive, interlocking system").
136. Cf id.
at 378-79 (describing the win-win model offered by new governance).

20151

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM SHAMING

and social differentiation rather than to individuality and equality."'' 37
Drawing upon the history of shaming, Dan Kahan argues that the "aesthetics of shame" are inevitably linked with the enforcement of hierarchy
and conformity. 138 Nussbaum states that shame penalties are "connected
to hierarchy and degradation."' 139 Others have similarly noted the argument that the State should not be engaged in the moral education of its
citizens. 140 In this account, shaming acts as the scarlet letter to enforce
social hierarchy and squelch individualism.
Although some may resist reform shaming on these grounds, this
Article contends that if the liberal State should ever act in a communitarian way, it is to protect the liberal values upon which it was foundedhere, the Bill of Rights and other constitutional principles reformers invoke to hold accountable the social institutions serving our most vulnerable. To the extent that hierarchy and conformity are being enforced,
they are enforced in the service of rights protection and conformity with
our most basic social values.
Reform shaming is also different from shaming writ large in that the
target is seldom a particular individual. As Nussbaum concedes, the
shaming of "powerful organizations" may be substantively different from
the shaming of a "fragile individual," even if that individual is extremely
powerful. 14 1 Although reform shaming is ultimately directed at individuals and not institutions, in that it confronts the employees and directors of
the institution, it seeks to change their professional actions, not their personal identities. It targets what they do, not who they are, and it does so
in recognition that the very nature of institutions as institutions (as opposed to people) can obscure their blameworthiness. As Fisse and
Braithwaite aptly describe in the context of corporate wrongdoing, the
"veil of corporateness" often "confound[s] the usual communal reactions
142
of blame and resentment.',
Finally, the State's involvement in reform shaming is much more
limited than that contemplated by traditional shaming. The would-be
shamers in this context are plaintiffs who seek institutional reform, not
the State itself, which is never required to mete out shame even if the
court rules in plaintiffs' favor. Reform shaming cannot take place without the State, however, in the sense that it capitalizes on the State137. Dan Kahan, What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEx. L. REV.
2075, 2076 (2006). See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 101, at 232 (objecting to the state's
involvement in shaming).
138. Kahan, supra note 137, at 2088. See also Massaro, The Meanings of Shame,
supra note 105, at 653.
139. NUSSBAUM, supra note 101, at 239.
140. Garvey, supra note 104, at 774.
141. NUSSBAUM, supra note 101, at 242, 244.
142. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at 2.
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sanctioned litigation process and the State's unique position to share information about relevant behavior with the community. 143 Reform shaming uses the State as a conduit for information; even in the absence of a
favorable court ruling, information is publicized and made available
through the litigation process, which itself generates information beyond
that which might be available through FOIA. The procedure of litigation
under the aegis of the State reveals and publicizes information that would
likely otherwise remain concealed.
2. Unpredictable Shame
Another argument against shaming centers on the powerful reactions shaming can unleash in those who do the shaming (as opposed to
those who are shamed). Martha Nussbaum and Toni Massaro are the
primary proponents of this line of criticism, which is frequently levied in
the context of shaming sanctions as criminal punishment. Massaro, for
example, argues that shaming penalties commit the same violation as the
underlying criminal offense, of treating others as objects. 144 Nussbaum's
primary concern is that shaming is "potentially linked to the denigration
of others," much like disgust.1 45 This normative shortcoming is compounded by the practical resulting consequences: the encouragement of
"lynch-mob justice," a decrease in deterrence because the penalty is no
longer prison, the unequal imposition of the penalty, and the debasement
of offenders. 146 Shaming, in this account, should be avoided precisely
because it is powerful and effective, because those powers are not easily
147
contained, and because its effects are not easily predicted.
The difference between shaming, as discussed by Nussbaum and
Massaro, and reform shaming, as discussed here, lies in the distinction
between disgust and indignation. Reform shaming may well result in
disgust, as directed at the conditions inside a particular institution for example, but the intent is not and should not be to generate disgust towards
the people responsible for creating those conditions. This Article contends that reform shaming, done properly, should not be personal. To
ensure maximum efficacy, which requires post-shaming reintegration,
143. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMS, supra note 116, at 96-97.
144. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at 699. See also Chad
Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment,54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 609, (2006).
145. NUSSBAUM, supra note 101, at 207.

146. Massaro, The Meanings ofShame, supra note 105, at 649; James

Q. Whitman,

What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1089 (1998);

NusSBAUM, supra note 101, at 235.
147. See, e.g., Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at 696 (arguing
that we cannot predict how shaming will work because it is dependent upon the individual reactions of both the would-be shamers and the shamed); NuSSBAUM, supra note 101,
at 15 (describing shaming as "normatively unreliable").
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reform shaming should not encourage disgust with the chief administrator, but rather behavior adjustment to ensure the institution in her charge
complies with the law.14 8 She, personally, should not be disgusting to us.
Neither is reform shaming likely to create the same type of mob mentality or enforcement of questionable norms as shaming in the criminal justice context does, because all it seeks is enforcement of the existing law
through the regular legal process. Perhaps even more importantly, the
shame narrative is itself designed to counter the more likely target of societal disgust: those served by the institutions in question.
Additionally, because structural reform shaming is given weight and
shape through the litigation process, there is little concern that defendants will have inadequate due process.1 49 When shame is deployed via
litigation, there is ample opportunity for response to allegations. Additionally, where shame is leveraged through public education or other
campaigns coordinated with the litigation, there is little concern that the
targeted institutions lack the resources to respond in kind. In the traditional shaming context, the concern is that individuals with relatively little power will be singled-out for shaming and unable to mount a response
sufficient to protect their interests. When the offender is an institution
with power over those it serves, the dynamic is, if anything, tilted to the
institution's advantage.
3. Ineffective Shame
The final group of objections centers on the practical consequences
of widespread shaming and argues that these consequences both dilute
the effects of shaming and increase the burden of proof on reformers. In
its simplest form, this critique points out that the more you shame, the
less effectively you can shame because shaming relies upon novelty to
succeed. 50 This phenomenon is related to the narrative in which the
populace becomes inured to heart-breaking stories when it sees too many
of them. There is a limited attention span for social issues that do not directly concern you, particularly when it comes to less sympathetic victims. Those in the institutions subject to reform are neither spotted owls

148. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of reintegrative shaming.
149. Cf Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1991)
(arguing shaming affords insufficient due process); Whitman, supra note 146, at 1088
(same).
150. See, e.g., Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, supra note
101, at 1930; Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Shaming: Why More Shaming May Deter Less 15 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Mtgs., Aug. 24, 2005),
http:ssm.com/abstract=-789244; Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at
694.
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the challenges
nor necessarily charismatic, and the literature describes
5
1
this may pose in the public interest litigation context.
There is an equally powerful argument that the repeated use of
shaming in the context of civil rights reform in particular makes future
such reform more difficult. As John White puts it, "all the questions in
civil rights cases have been transformed into the unseemly quest to convince the judge that what took place, what happened to your client, was
the most outrageous thing ever. Few cases can bear the weight of this
proof. 1 52 Shaming, in this description, can operate as a one-way ratchet
to the great detriment of subsequent claims, which each face an everincreasing need to shock and horrify.
Finally, another variant of this objection contends that the modem
liberal society in which we live is inured to shame because it is diverse,
multi-cultural, and individualistic. Scholars making this argument typically contrast today's Western cultures with more traditional cultures in
which shame plays a prominent role, such as Japan.153 Modem Americans, in other words, are shameless. 154 A variation on this argument
holds that even where cultural conditions may be ripe for shaming, our
society is simply too large and diffuse for it to work because shaming requires repeat players in smaller settings. 15 5 On the institutional level,
some have argued that the widespread trend toward deregulation, commakes
pounded by the "glorification of infamy" for corporate offenders,
1 56
succeed.
to
unlikely
corporations
or
shaming of agencies
This final set of objections is deeply rooted in the realities and exigencies of practice and therefore difficult to persuasively address. Perhaps it is simply true that widespread reform shaming would eventually
be counterproductive. But it seems unlikely that we have reached the
saturation point and, regardless, reform shaming will continue to take
place only for as long as litigators and reformers deem it an effective
tool. This Article's focus is on ensuring that it is done as effectively as
possible when it is used, and one of the ways in which reformers can

151. Rhode, supranote 31, at 2044-45 (describing difficulty of lawyering on behalf
of unsympathetic clients and issues presented by "cultural complacency," the belief that a
particular problem has already been resolved).
152. John V. White, supra note 32, at 640.
153. See, e.g., Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at 676-78 (describing the culture of shame in pre-World War II Japan).
154. See, e.g., Gwendolyn Yvonne Alexis & Steven Pressman, After Shame: Before
CorporateMoral Obligation (CMO): EthicalLag and the Credit Crisis,4 INT'L J. MGMT
CONCEPTS & PHIL. 244, 248 (2010); Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at
693-94.
155. See, e.g., Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at 685. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991).

156. Alexis & Pressman, supra note 154, at 249, 253.
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maximize its effectiveness is to use it in such a way as to take account of
the diverse society in which it must operate.
III. GENERAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM SHAMING GUIDELINES
There are any number of reasons to improve the efficacy with which
reform shaming is conducted, but the most obvious and compelling of
these is that litigators are already engaged in this type of shaming and
would benefit from a comprehensive analysis of how to do it even more
effectively. Shaming to leverage reform is already an essential part of
the reform litigator's playbook because it works, capitalizing on a deeply
rooted part of what makes us human to produce results. But reform
shaming will work even better if we take the time to explore and understand the behavioral psychology and social dynamics behind shaming
and think carefully about how best to exploit these dynamics in the context of complex civil litigation.
Although reformers are already using shame in many of the ways
described below, the goal should be to shame with intention, and to do so
with care. Shaming is, as Eric Posner notes, "an entrepreneurial activity"
requiring time and effort.' 5 7 It is not without risk to would-be shamers,
who may be subject to retaliation if the community decides that they
themselves should be shunned as busybodies or deceivers.' 58 The goal of
this Part is to elaborate upon the essential components of shaming in the
context of institutional reform, providing concrete ways in which reformers can draw upon shame as a complementary regulatory system
that
159
capacity.
system's
regulatory
existing
the
enhances
and
amplifies
A. Understandingthe Role of Publicity
Publicity is an element critical to any shaming, but reform shaming
in particular. If no one knows that a standard has not been met, one is
less likely to experience shame. 160 Indeed, some have speculated that a
lack of publicity may inhibit not only the enforcement of a norm through

157. ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIALNORMS, supranote 116, at 89.

158. Id. at 90.
159. Cf Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV.

INT'L L.J. 51, 108 (2010) (describing the use of multiple, complimentary, and interrelated regulatory regimes at once).
160. See, e.g., Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 101, at 374 (noting that "shame requires information"). Some have speculated that the emotion one might feel in the absence of publicity is guilt, rather than shame. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 111, at 380;

Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 101, at 371.
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shame, but also the initial creation of the norm itself.16 1 Although there
is a wealth of existing literature on publicity, this literature falls short of
providing what reformers need: it often fails to describe how and why
publicity works to generate reform, it too easily dismisses the importance
of the underlying litigation, and it does not identify the most effective
audiences for reform shaming.
Much of the commentary on the relationship between litigation and
media publicity posits that litigation is an effective means of generating
publicity and that generating publicity is desirable. 162 However, it does
not devote sufficient attention to the question of how litigation-generated
publicity actually works to produce or leverage reform: publicity is valuable precisely because it is a critical component of shaming, and publicity in the absence of shame is unlikely to produce reform.
Publicity is a necessary component of shaming, but shaming is also
a necessary component for publicity to produce reform. This dynamic
holds true particularly in the institutional reform context, where potential
defendants are often wholly unashamed of their actions. These institutional actors may even brag that their behavior is saving the public money or justly enhancing the punitivity of punishment or the severity of ostracism. 163 Mere publication of this type of action does not result in
shame, much less reform. Yet, it is easy to see why reformers and other
like-minded individuals may believe publicity alone to be sufficient; they
have so fully internalized certain norms that, in their minds, the complained-of actions are plainly shameful on their face. Understanding
how and why publicity works to produce reform-through the shaming
dynamic-underscores the need for reformers to make the violation of a
clearly established social norm explicit. 164 Once the shaming is complete, publicity can play a role in the reintegrative process discussed be-

161. McAdams, supra note 111, at 388 ("When the existence of the consensus or
the risk of detection is less than obvious, even a strong consensus may never produce a
norm.").
162. See, e.g., HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 65, at 216 (noting that
"litigation is one of the most effective ways to win publicity for a cause"); MCCANN,
RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 47, at 58 (same). See also Lobel, Courts as Forumsfor
Protest, supra note 57, at 510-29 (describing literature and case law on the propriety of
media campaigns).
163. See, e.g., Faith Karimi, SheriffJoe Arpaio: 38 Arizona Inmates who Defaced
Flag to eat Only Bread, Water, CNN (Jan. 24, 2014, 7:48 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/24 /justice/arizona-inmates-bread-water/ (stating that Sheriff Arpaio "issued pink underwear to the men detained in the county's jails and said he is
saving taxpayers money by removing salt and pepper from prison meals").
164. See infra Part III.B.
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low as well, serving as a means of welcoming offenders back into the
fold. 165
1. Publicity and Litigation
The existing literature on publicity and reform tends to emphasize
the benefits of litigation regardless of court victory. 166 Although this line
of commentary is both persuasive and empirically accurate, it may have
resulted in an over-correction where the importance of the underlying litigation reform efforts have become too understated and where litigation
appears to serve only as a mechanism for generating publicity rather than
as an essential tool for reform. Joel Handler, for example, emphasizes
that "law reformers do not expect to achieve results through a court or
administrative order; such proceedings will take too long or become too
costly. .. . Rather, they use legal proceedings to generate
harmful pub'1 67
licity that will force the discriminator into a settlement.
This account of reform litigation is not untrue, but does not paint a
complete picture of the relationship between litigation, publicity, and reform. Litigation need not result in court-ordered victory to succeed in
procuring reform, and it often does so via settlement. But if the underlying legal case is weak, the publicity and bargaining leverage generated
will be weak as well. In order to maximize litigation-generated leverage,
reformers must structure that litigation properly, both from a purely legal
perspective and from a shaming perspective. Litigation that falls short
on either front may still generate publicity, but that publicity is unlikely
to produce reform. That said, reform shaming could work with publicity
to strengthen doctrinally weak cases.
The existing literature also typically gives short shrift to the role
that litigators play in generating the information needed for a publicity
campaign. Similarly, in most of the literature on shaming, the government is described as the key purveyor and distributor of information, as
68
when shaming is used in addition to or instead of criminal punishment. 1

165. Cf Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-An Alternative Punitive Damage
Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 341, 382 (1996) (arguing that "publicity sanctions enable
society to engage in moral reflection about corporate offenses instead of keeping them
from the public eye.").
166. See supraPart I.C.2.
167. HANDLER, supra note 65, at 214.
168. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 101, at 370 ("The government captures
and exposes [] criminals."); Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at 699
(arguing that "[p]erhaps the most serious potential side effect of expressing contempt for
offenders through shame penalties is how official shaming may erode decency norms and
transform the role of the government in policing criminal conduct"); Posner & Rasmusen,
supra note 101, at 380 ("An additional role of government in relation to norm enforce-
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This Article notes that reformers-and litigators in particular-may also
obtain and distribute information for shaming purposes.
2. Publicity's Audience
Little of the current writing on publicity and reform focuses on the
appropriate audience for the shaming message, which is not the general
public writ large. Shaming requires shared social norms, which are more
likely to be found in smaller communities, and effective reform shaming
may require appealing to different norms (or variations upon norms) for
different interlocking subgroups. The nature of the litigation and relief
requested drives the composition of the target audiences, which in turn
drives the content of the shaming message. More commentary is needed
on the impact of the new information age on the use of the media and
publicity to leverage reform, but for now it is sufficient to note that today's technology and information access can serve either to increase or
decrease shaming efficacy.
Publicity today is unpredictable. It is increasingly driven by media
consumers (as opposed to producers) and offers unprecedented information access. Reform shaming stories can easily get lost in the shuffle,
or the public can become overloaded-but it is also more possible for the
stories to reach a greater audience and to target particular ones.
Likely audiences for reform shaming will include the local polity,
the government officials responsible for administering the institution or
the contract under which the institution is operated, the offenders themselves, the judge, and other government administrative and/or enforcement entities, which may engage in non-litigation enforcement action
they would not otherwise have due to lack of resources, motivation, or
knowledge. 169 The victims of institutional rights violations may not matter to the offenders, but the targeted audience must. As Toni Massaro
notes in the criminal law context, shaming works only if it threatens 170a
significant and valued relationship, typically with a larger group.
Shaming has two aspects, the emotions the offender may experience
(e.g., fear, anxiety at being revealed, and guilt) and the reaction the
community may have, which often takes the form of shunning or withdrawal. 171 As others have noted, in order for shaming to be effective or
even to take place at all, the offender must fear being shunned or banment is to provide information. If multilateral or shame sanctions are to work, the violation must be publicized.").
169. Cf FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at 2 (commenting on this phenomenon in the context of corporate crime).
170. Massaro, Shame, Culture &American Criminal Law, supra note 101, at 1883,
1902.
171. Id. at 1900-03.
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ished from the community.172 Nowhere is this truer than in the context of
reform shaming, which does not rely on or require the offender to experience any particular emotions.
Instead of emotional anxiety, reform shaming relies on a different
sort of fear. For instance, for-profit institutions operating under contract
with government agencies will fear withdrawal of those contracts, and
non-profits and government agencies will fear public and political pressure to reform, possibly manifested by voter disapproval or withdrawal
of funding support. That said, the heads of these institutions are human,
and inevitably driven by the human desire for group membership. In this
context, being a group member, i.e., the head of an institution, has concrete economic and prestige benefits, and being expelled from the group
can come with personal reputational harm.1 73 As has been noted in the
have elections to win, business deals to
context of corporate CEOs, "they
74
make, and careers to advance.'

The desire to remain in the group can drive some to cheat, but may
also be leveraged for reform. 175 Successful reform shaming appeals to
individual policymakers and institutional administrators on two levels:
first, as a rational self-interested actor who seeks to avoid harm to the institution and to protect their professional reputation;' 76 and second, as a
human being with a conscience, raised in a community governed by certain basic norms, such as not harming the vulnerable. 177 The two aspects
are intertwined because reformers need both the reputation and the norms
to matter. If the offender cares about the former but not the latter, as
when there is no shared perception that a norm has been violated, shaming does not work; and if the norm has been violated but the offender
cares not one whit about reputation, shaming will not work either. Luckily, even in the case of truly shameless offenders, "the very process of
shaming has the effect of establishing and cementing the asserted
172. Id. at 1903; see also id. at n. 108 ("Effective shunning practices, like effective
shaming, require audience participation. The audience must be willing to assume not only the role of approving spectator, but also that of active disciplinarian.").
173. See, e.g., Sandeep Golan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J.
CoRiP. L. 757, 766 (2007) ("As long as reputation is not completely irrelevant, shame
matters.").
174. Id. at 766-67.
175. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, In Atlanta, Jury Selection is Set to Begin in Test
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/l1/us/atlantajury-selection-set-to-begin-school-employees-accused-of-attering-test-scores.htm?-r=(describing Atlanta schools superintendent cheating scandal).
176. Cf Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note 6, at 78 ("People care about
their reputations and they have an incentive to do what (they think) other group members
think they should do.").
177. Cf ELLICKSON, supra note 155, at 244-46 (discussing the role of conscience
and self-discipline in controlling behavior).
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norm-not a trivial function because it tells others' 178
who might become
directors or CEOs that bad conduct invites shaming."
Thus, the core audience for reform shaming is actually the offenders
themselves, who see the messages for all other audences through their
eyes. Reform shaming is unlike standard shaming in that it does not require offenders to actually feel shame qua shame in order to be successful. It is sufficient that they react to the belief that others think they
should feel shame, and to the attendant consequences, such as decreased
revenue.179 Shaming relies upon a fear not just of publicity, but that others will act upon the information revealed. In a community setting, the
reaction may manifest itself as social shunning; in the corporate or political context, contracts may be withdrawn or not renewed, shareholders
may sell, or activist investors may lobby for change. The particular audience that matters to defendants, and thus the norms that will be most
effective, will vary, for example depending on whether the institution in
question is a government agency or a for-profit corporation operating
under contract with a government agency.
B. Norm-Sharing& Shifting
Publicity is meaningless in the absence of a failure to meet a standard, which may be supplied by law, social norm, or both, with the former
serving to codify the latter.' 80 Because litigators specialize in the former,
this Section will focus on how successful reform shaming capitalizes on
the violation of social norms, both those that have been formalized in the
law and, perhaps more importantly, those that have not. It will describe
the creation and enforcement of social norms with respect to shaming
and is designed to help litigators and reformers understand the role these
norms play in the shame and reform dynamic.
In his seminal book, Order without Law, Robert Ellickson describes
how social norms can function apart from state mechanisms of law enforcement, enable social cooperation to mutual advantage, and act to
Judge
control "deviants," or those who refuse to abide by the norms.'
"a
Richard Posner and Eric Rasmussen similarly define a norm as social
178. Golan, supra note 173, at 766.
179. In a series of case studies in the context of corporate crime, Fisse and
Braithwaite found that most corporate executives believed their corporate image had suffered as a result of adverse publicity and that there was an accompanying decline in the
prestige they enjoyed in their communities. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at
232. They also found that adverse publicity did indeed have a negative impact on at least
short-term corporate earnings. Id. at 231.
180. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 111, at 402; John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms
Matter? A Cross Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2151, 2156-57 (2001).
181. ELLICKSON, supra note 155, at I, 31 n.7.
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rule that does not depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement.' 82 The social norms that govern our behavior range from the
mundane (where to stand in an elevator) to the profound (how to treat the
elderly) and can vary widely from community to community (when to
call the police). They also govern the behavior of institutions, which are
organized, operated, and constituted by members of different communities.
Reform shaming both takes advantage of existing norms, and seeks
to impress upon institutions the importance of adopting and internalizing
these norms. 183 The short-term goal of institutional reform is to fix the
particular institution at issue and to stop its rights-violating behavior.
But the long term, and less often discussed, goals are to: (1) shift the social norms at that particular institution so that the gains achieved are not
just short-term or cosmetic; (2) shift the social norms that govern all similarly situated institutions towards increased regulatory compliance,
transparency and accountability; and (3) create the conditions by which
social norms are enforced via the transparency provided by publicity,
wherein transparency is used to generate both internal and external accountability.
Sometimes this activity is described as law reform, which seeks to
change what Sunstein calls law's "expressive function, . . . the function
of law in expressing social values with the particular goal of shifting social norms. 1 84 But reform activity that targets norms can be just as important, if not more important, than that which seeks to change only the
law, which is not always amenable to being changed and which sometimes already says just what it needs to say.' 85 Shaming seeks to exploit
the gap between an institution's practices, on the one hand, and social
and/or legal norms on the other. From a pragmatic litigation perspective,
reform is easiest when the disconnect exists at both levels, more difficult
when only legal norms are being violated, and (arguably) most difficult
when only social norms are being violated-but it is in this last context
that shame can provide the most leverage.

182. Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 101, at 369.
183. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 147 (urging the formation of "a
communitarian corporate culture in which I feel responsible not only for my own part of
the operation but for the totality of the operation, and indeed in which I feel a responsibility to the community that consumes our products or services").
184. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. ,Ev.903, 910
(1996).
185. Cf SCHEINGOLD, supra note 39, at 68.
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1. The Norm Community
The norm community is the community within which the applicable
norm is shared; it is distinct from but overlaps with the publicity audience discussed in Part III.A.2. Those who study shame regularly note
that its efficacy increases as the group size decreases. 86 Close knit religious or ethnic communities are theoretically ideal for shaming but, in
their absence, a general shame culture will suffice. 8 7 Reform shaming,
however, cannot capitalize on a shame culture such as that of the Japanese, 188 and takes place in groups that are typically neither small nor
communities in the traditional sense of the word.
This Article posits that successful reform shaming recognizes that
the relevant community is the legal and political community within
which these institutions operate.' 89 Shame sanctions imposed by those
who are close to us, such as friends and family, are more effective than
those imposed by the government. 19° However, shaming by the state, or
through the state process of litigation, can trigger community shaming
and bring norm violations to the community's attention. 191 Furthermore,
as others have noted in the corporate context, those who lead the institutions in question also constitute a community with its own culture.' 92 Effective reform shaming often identifies agency shortcomings in comparison to peer and competitor institutions, noting that others are meeting
standards that the defendant has not.
Finally, the litigation itself also creates a small community, with the
legal process and doctrine providing a background set of norms. 193 Litigation serves as a particularly powerful vehicle for reform shaming pre-

186. See, e.g., Massaro, The Meanings of Shame, supra note 105, at 682 (noting that
[i]n intimate societies, the organs of authority often deliver both praise and rebuke" that
make shaming an effective tool for social control); ELLICKSON, supra note 155, at 17781; see also Richard A. Posner, SocialNorms and the Law, supranote 112, at 366.
187. See, e.g., Massaro, Shame, Culture & American CriminalLaw, supra note 101,
at 1907-08 ("Anthropologists have identified as shame cultures ones in which the members make frequent conscious use of shaming as a means of behavior control.");
BRAITHWAITE, supranote 103, at 57.
188. Cf BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 61-65 (describing shaming culture in Japan).
189. Others have noted the importance of cultural homogeneity and shared norms to
the success of shaming but the relevant culture and norms here are not American, per se,
but the American legal system and norms supplied by that system.
190. Cf BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 69.
191. Id. at 97.
192. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 966 (1999).
193. See also Seul, supranote 86, at 901 (noting that the context and form of litigation demonstrates the commitment of the parties "to inhabit a social system that is capable of containing and processing their dispute in a reasonably pacific manner").
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cisely because it underscores the relevance of the shared norms via the
applicable law, creating an environment in which norms and law explicitly and implicitly reinforce one another. It provides for an automatic set
of shared norms, i.e., those that govern litigating a case in court, which
can serve as scaffolding for the adoption of other norms that may not be
as readily shared. It also provides for a mechanism by which the community group can withdraw from the offender, in this case via the imposition of court sanctions or adverse rulings. 194 Finally, it provides for the
eventual reintegration of the offenders via settlement agreements, consent decrees, claim releases, and the like.
2. Which Norms
Some norms are readily shared (e.g., do not kick puppies or babies),
but the enforcement of others through shaming can depend very much on
tailoring the norm invoked to the norm community. No amount of publicity will result in the desired shame effect if reformers appeal to the
wrong norm. An attempt to shift deep-seated and often hidden or unconscious norms regarding bias, for example, is much less likely to be successful than an attempt to reinforce the application of existing universal
norms to particular minorities.' 95 And so the fight for "gay marriage" becomes a fight for the "freedom to marry."' 196 Reformers need not create
new social norms from scratch and, given what we know about norm
creation, such efforts are unlikely to work. But, to borrow a metaphor
from the international human rights context, "thick grooves have already
been carved by market networks, religious networks, customary networks and professional networks."'' 97 Identifying and utilizing the relevant existing grooves, and shifting those grooves where necessary, will
nearly always be preferable to carving new grooves altogether.
Reform litigators routinely invoke regulatory and constitutional
compliance norms, e.g., do not violate the Constitution and deprive peo-

194. Cf Massaro, Shame, Culture & American Criminal Law, supra note 101, at
1883 (noting that "legal sanctions must actually compromise potential offenders' group
social standing" and that the shaming must be communicated to the group, which withdraws from the offender).
195. Cf FISSE & BRTI-IWAITE, supra note 120, at 292-93 (noting that they do not
seek "the quantum leap required to resolve the problem of racial discrimination, but...
the less exacting kind of attitudinal shifts that companies themselves seek to achieve by
means of corporate image advertising").
196. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to
Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1375, 1423 (2010).
197. Woods, supra note 159, at 98.
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ple of their rights. 198 However, there is a wealth of richer norms even
more deeply rooted in our common humanity to which reformers can also appeal, e.g., do not harm those who are least able to protect themselves. This Article contends that appeal to these norms, both explicitly
and implicitly, can operate functionally to expand the norm community
and thereby improve shaming efficacy. Other times, reformers can and
should argue for the expansion of the application of existing powerful
norms to new populations, such as prisoners or immigrants.
3. Norm-Shifting
Reform litigation is most necessary when publicity alone is insufficient to rectify the problem because the norm being invoked is not
shared-whether by defendants, who take pride in their actions or the
general public that supports the behavior. 99 Because the institutions in
question typically serve the most disadvantaged and/or despised individuals in society, such as prisoners or the mentally ill, there is often a need
for norm shifting. Norm shifting is needed when legal change is either
insufficient or unlikely because a cultural change is needed first.2 00 Unlike norm creation, which seeks to create new norms wholesale, norm
shifting in the reform context typically seeks to expand the application of
existing norms, shifting the populations to which they apply. Because
the shifting takes place within the context of civil litigation, which by
definition invokes existing legal norms, the goal is to stretch social
norms to enforce and expand existing law.
Others have opined on the relationship between social and legal
change and the use of the latter to generate the former. Gerald Torres
describes the interplay between the two as one in which litigation must
simultaneously conform to the "institutional imperatives of law" and reframe and shift those imperatives to change the law with the ultimate
goal of wider cultural change. 20 1 But there is less discussion of the role
reform shaming plays in the shifting process, which is to help stretch and
198. Cf McCann, Mobilization ofLaw, supra note 40, at 212 (speculating that "the
continuing salience of [certain] public policy issues itself stems in large part from their
definition as legal 'injuries' or 'wrongs"').
199. Cf Brent T. White, Say You're Sorry: Court OrderedApologies as a Civil
Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1262, 1292 (2006) (noting that "negative publicity
is less effective as a sanction-and may in fact be completely ineffective-when a majority of the population seems to agree with the wrongful act....").
200. Cf Gerald Torres, Legal Change, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 135, 137 (2007)
("[M]ajor legal change only occurs when the technical legal rule changes are accompanied by cultural change.").
201. Id. at 138-42. See also, e.g., Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 3, at 393 (describing need to use "soft law" where gap between the aspiration and reality are so large
that hard law is useless).
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develop existing social norms both to enforce and, critically, expand, existing law.
The most effective reform litigators function as norm entrepreneurs
in this dynamic, people who intentionally seek to change behavior and
influence norm development. 2 As described by Sunstein and Posner,
typical norm entrepreneurs include journalists, politicians, and political
activists. 20 3 These individuals raise the public's consciousness of a particular problem and suggest collective solutions. 20 4 As Sunstein describes it, they "exploit widespread dissatisfaction with existing norms
by (a) signaling their own commitment to change, (b) creating coalitions,
(c) making defiance of the norms seem to be less costly, and (d) making
compliance with new norms seem or be more beneficial. 20 5 In so doing,
they create a tipping point that pushes norms in a different direction, in
part by creating a norm bandwagon.
Reform litigators, particularly those who engage in repeat play, are
well suited to norm entrepreneurship. They bear a sustained interest in
the long-term structure of the institutions in question; develop expertise
in the area; and may be able to convince agency officials that new norms,
or compliance with existing norms, will inure to the institution's benefit. 20 6 Eventually, if reform shaming is successful, even cosmetic action
designed to avoid reputational harm or to maximize profits may eventually lead to increased buy-in to a shared set of norms.
C. Shaming Bureaucraticand CorporateEntities
This Section will explore the unique contours and challenges of
shaming institutions that do not experience emotions.20 7 Shaming individual wrongdoers is rarely, if ever, the goal of reform shaming, which
seeks instead to make structural changes to a wholesale culture of
wrongdoing. Relief in this type of litigation is generally prospective, not
retrospective (damages), because no single actor or action created the
problems. But as organizations grow in size, they become more difficult

202. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 116, at 30; Sunstein, Social Norms andSocial Roles, supra note 184, at 929. See also McAdams, supra note 111,
at 370 (discussing the concept of "first movers" in the formation of social norms).
203. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 116, at 31-32.
204. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 184, at 929.
205. Id.
206. Harris, supra note 123, at 913-16.
207. This conversation is distinct but borrows from the existing corporate shaming
literature, which focuses largely on the use of adverse publicity orders as punishment.
See, e.g., Brent Fisse, Sentencing Options Against Corporations,1 CRIM. L. FORUM 211,
239-44 (1990) (discussing utility of adverse publicity).
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to manage
and, by extension, to reform regardless of institutional will or
208
ability.
A growing body of scholarship suggests that the complexity of institutional reform in large part stems from the complexity inherent to
working with large institutions-changing operations can be a massive
endeavor even with full administrative buy-in absent a lawsuit.2°9 Organizations seek to avoid uncertainty and prefer to stay within the
bounds of their standard operating procedures. 2 0 Those organizations
serving the public may over time act in their own self-interest rather than
in the interest of the public they are meant to serve. 21' Where, as is increasingly often, profit is part of the organization's self-interest, 212 the
institutional misbehavior may actually be a wholly "rational" profit maximization attempt.213 Reform shaming aims to counteract a number of
these barriers by levering on several pressure points: publicity, profit,
applicable regulation, and the desire to protect both the group and one's
individual reputation.2 14
In some ways, it can be easier to shame institutional entities rather
than individual offenders, who may choose to reject the shaming rubric
entirely. 2 15 Institutions, and corporate entities in particular, rarely have
the luxury of ignoring their reputations and therefore must defend themselves to the public and sometimes to their shareholders.21 6 Institutions
subject to reform shaming are, moreover, social creations designed to
208. See, e.g., Note, ImplementationProblems in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 91
HARV. L. REV. 428, 432 (1978).
209. Catherine Y. Kim, Changed Circumstances: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure and the Future of InstitutionalReform Litigation After Home v. Flores, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1435, 1437-43 (2013); David Zaring, NationalRulemaking Through Trial
Courts: The Big Case and InstitutionalReform, 51 UCLAL. REv. 1015, 1018-22 (2004);
William A. Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution: InstitutionalRemedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 637-39 (1982). See also THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 122 (Haridimos Tsoukas & Christian Knudsen eds., 2003); RICHARD DAFT, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN 405 (6th ed. 2006).
210. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE

CRISIS 83-84 (1971).
211. See, e.g., Robert B. Denhardt & Janet Vinzant Denhardt, The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 549, 557 (2000); PETER BLOCK,
STEWARDSHIP: CHOOSING SERVICE OVER SELF-INTEREST 15-16 (1993).
212. The operation of the institutions at issue has increasingly been outsourced to
private, for-profit companies. See, e.g., Chiang, No State Actor Left Behind, supra note
133, at 618-19; Ashar, supra note 99, at 1917 (noting that government social welfare
functions are increasingly outsourced to corporations).
213. See, e.g., FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at 301.
214. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 126; John L. Campbell, Why Would
CorporationsBehave in Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 946, 952-54 (2007).
215. Cf BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 21-22 (describing gang-member transgressions as motivated by the desire to portray "toughness").
216. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 120, at 247.
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serve social needs and are thus doubly accountable. 2 17 Their potential
responses are thus limited to denial that a violation has taken place, or
rejection of the social norm purportedly violated. The former is dealt
with on the face of the pleadings, and the latter underscores the importance of careful norm selection and framing, particularly where the
institution serves a politically powerless and/or unsympathetic population.
That said, institutions are founded and run by individuals, and reform shaming can be particularly effective at leveraging their individual
desire to minimize personal harm.2 18 Commentators in the corporate
shaming context have described three relevant types of such harm: damage to future political careers or shame in the eyes of public opinion; decreased or lost future wages; and general societal reputational injury.219
Each of these is implicated by reform shaming, which structures the narrative of wrongdoing to pressure government contract administrators to
reconsider the contract and to maximize the fear that both they and those
who operate the institution will feel embarrassment at church or the
country club.22 °
D. ReintegrativeShaming
Those who study the use of shame in other contexts have long contended that it must be reintegrative in order to modify behavior. In the
criminal law context, for example, it is suspected that reintegrative shaming, which welcomes the offender back into the community fold and
shames while maintaining bonds of respect, can reduce crime but that
stigmatization (shame without the respect) merely operates to create
criminal subcultures that continue to offend, as in gangs that reward lawbreaking.221 Others have also argued that, in this context, shaming can
be used as an opportunity for moral education, in which the goal is not
merely punishment, but reformation and repentance.2 22 Ultimately, the
goal is to provide, as an essential part of the shaming
experience, a way
223
for the shamed to "regain[] community esteem.
217. Cf Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudenceand Public Interest
Law, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 498 (1999) (noting that "institutional actions and expectations ...are social in nature").
218. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 125 (citing sources).
219. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the
Media, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 9309
at 4, October 2002) availableat http://nber.org/papers/w9309.
220. Id. See also Barnard, supra note 192, at 967, n.30 (citing studies).
221. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 12-13.
222. Garvey, supra note 104, at 763.
223. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, supra note 101, at
1883.
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In the institutional reform context, the need is not to prevent lawless
gangs, but a culture of resistance to government regulation and oversight. 4 Managers and agency heads may not conduct initiation rituals
for those who defy the law or violate rights, but if no one complies with
the law and everyone knows that no one complies, compliance may itself
become stigmatized. Similarly, some subcultures take pride in violating
the rights of certain groups such as undocumented workers or alleged
gang members. 5 These cultures may take great offense at being asked
to change, responding with increased resistance and retrenchment of the
culture.226
To avoid this, some have written that we must not punish those who
genuinely wish to comply and that we should give those individuals and
entities second chances.22 v In the context of systemic reform, we can do
this by encouraging negotiated settlement and by not labeling offenders
as "irresponsible, untrustworthy outcasts. ,,228 Reintegration in the criminal context may come in the form of "gestures of reacceptance into the
community of law-abiding citizens., 229 Reintegration in the reform context can come as an agreement to dismiss a party to the suit (or the suit
entirely); a jointly crafted settlement agreement and/or the issuance of a
joint press release; joint media appearances in which the parties are
friendly with one another; and positive "gossip" about former defendants
to other would-be defendants and policymakers. Others have speculated
that defendants often settle cases to make themselves look better.230 The
lesson offered by reintegrative shaming is that reformers should let them.
Others have advocated in favor of court-ordered apologies in the
context of civil rights cases, arguing that they heal psychological
wounds, reinforce norms, restore social equilibrium, and deter future
wrongdoing. 231 There is a difference, however, between apologies that
serve as a shaming mechanism and those that reintegrate the offender

224. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 103, at 129-30 (describing organized business subcultures of resistance to regulation).
225. See, e.g., Jacques Billeaud & Walter Berry, Ariz. Sheriff Joe Arpaio Profiled
Latinos, Judge Rules, MSNBC (May 25, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.msnbc.com
/msnbc/ariz (quoting Sheriff Arpaio as saying "[o]urs is an operation.., to go after illegals, not the crime first, that they happen to be illegals.... My program, my philosophy
is a pure program. You go after illegals. I'm not afraid to say that.").
226. Francisco Valdes, Culture by Law: Backlash as Jurisprudence, 50 VILL. L.
REv. 1135, 1156-57(2005).
227. BRAITHWAITE, supranote 103, at 131.
228. Id. at 132.
229. Id. at 55.
230. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail
andPrisonCourt Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 594 (2006).
231. Brent T. White, supra note 199, at 1270.

2015]

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM SHAMING

post-shaming.23 2 Successful reform shaming does not focus on satisfying
the psychological needs of the individually named plaintiffs,233 but rather
reintegrates offenders so that they are more likely to engage with the reform process and, perhaps eventually, internalize social norms. 234 The
public apology and reintegration process offers something akin to a facesaving outlet for defendants, who may then be welcomed back into the
fold of law-abiding citizens and government contract holders. 35
Compliance with social norms is most easily procured in small
groups of repeat players because compliance is more transparent (i.e.,
people can tell whether you are cheating), everyone knows one another,
and everyone is in the game for the long haul.236 Such groups create the
conditions for the "multiplex" relationships that provide for "iterated"
play.23 7 Creating these conditions can be difficult in the institutional reform context, but reform shaming suggests two ways to do so. First, a
consistent plaintiff's bar dedicated to the enforcement of particular social
norms can help create a multiplex relationship between policymakers and
the plaintiffs bar because the former knows they may continually be
subject to suit by the latter. Second, defendants cannot be treated as
group outsiders for reform shaming to work. The ultimate goal of reform
shaming is not to ostracize offenders but rather to integrate them. Reform that connects offenders who may be isolated and unaware of a national community and established norms is reform that is more likely to
work, in part because it creates the conditions for iterated play and multiplex relationships. People are inclined to follow social conventions and
will look to their peers to determine what those conventions are. If they
receive information indicating that conventions have changed, they are
more likely to modify their behavior as well.2 38 Reformers and litigators
are well advised to provide information and contacts to defendants, such
as existing national standards and governing or advisory bodies.
232. Cf id. at 1268 (noting that court-ordered apologies in the criminal context operate largely as a shaming mechanism).
233. Cf id at 1274 (emphasizing the role apologies play in alleviating the psychological distress experienced by victims of civil rights violations).
234. The tension between what individual plaintiffs would like and what is best for
the class as a whole is an old one and endemic to structural reform litigation. See, e.g.,
Symposium, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625,
626 (1987).
235. Cf ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME 170-81 (2001) (describing reconciliation and reparation in the international human rights context).
236. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 111, at 389 (noting that "the smaller the
group, the more intensely esteem is valued."); Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law
and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78
B.U. L. REv. 903, 907-09 (1998).
237. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 155, at 55.
238. Woods, supra note 159, at 58-61.
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USING LITIGATION MORE EFFECTIVELY TO GENERATE SHAME

Institutional reform litigators already draw extensively on shaming
in their work. As Harold Hongju Koh has noted, Linda Brown was not
"seeking just to walk fewer blocks to a school bus in Topeka, Kansas., 239
She sought instead a judicial declaration of systemic wrongdoing that she
could then "use to convert principle into political power., 240 But there is
room for improvement. This Part will focus on the concrete application
of the lessons and principals derived above to the specific context of institutional reform litigation, offering suggestions on how best to take advantage of the shame dynamic in each conceptually critical stage of litigation: pre-filing, complaint, discovery, and settlement.24 1
This Article focuses on litigation in particular (as opposed to other
reform strategies) because litigation is the least understood context in
which shame operates to generate reform and because litigation remains
essential to the reform process. 242 Legislative or other political reform
may remain the gold standard, but some form of litigation (or the threat
thereof) is almost always essential to produce institutional reform, in
which the very need for reform stems from a lack of political will to
serve the politically powerless. 243 Institutional reform shaming does not
deny the inherent limits of litigation; it seeks to amplify litigation's role
as a catalyst.
The examination of reform shaming in the context of litigation is also a rich line of inquiry because the narrative of institutional reform litigation is at heart more about shame than doctrine. The legal story must
be told within the confines of the modem litigation process, but it centers
on defendants' (mis)treatment of the most vulnerable in our society.
More practically speaking, litigation is also a critical source of the information necessary for successful shaming in other reform contexts, such
as public education or lobbying. Although FOIA and its state equivalents are useful, discovery mandated by the rules of civil procedure is often the only effective way to access certain types of information, such as

239. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2396 (1991) (describing the goals of the named plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education).
240. Id.
241. Shaming is of course relevant to the trial process, but the lessons offered are
largely the same as those for the other stages of litigation.
242. See infra Part I.C. 1 for a discussion regarding continuing need for litigation.
243. Cf Cummings & Rhode, supra note 12, at 612 ("Reforms that come through
the legislative process may appear more legitimate than those than come through
courts.").
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that possessed by private actors or which defendants would otherwise
seek to conceal, i.e., evidence that a norm has been violated. 2 "
A. Pre-Filing
Institutional reform litigation commences far before the complaint
is actually filed with the gathering of publicly available information
through FOIA (or state equivalent) requests, witness interviews, online
research, and informal requests for information. 45 This information creates a feedback loop that generates additional information; as FOIA requests are refined, more detailed inquiries can be made of witnesses, and
more specific searches for documents can be performed.246 The overt
goal is to amass information sufficient to establish the basis for a complaint.247
Reform shaming teaches us that the goal is also to gather shamegenerating information-information that evidences not just illegal activity but also the violation of a social norm. For example, in the case of a
disciplinary alternative school being operated by a for-profit company in
Atlanta, Georgia, preliminary interviews indicated that students were not
just subjected to invasive searches without reasonable suspicion but also
that female students were required "to pop their bras" (extend their bra
straps out from their bodies).2 48 Although this component of the school's
search procedure was governed by the same doctrine that covers patdown searches, it violates a more deeply rooted social norm and is thus
more shame-worthy. Such information is also valuable for the recruitment of the pro bono lawyers who increasingly drive and fund systemic
reform litigation.249
As litigators have long understood, the public revelation of shameful information is sometimes sufficient to produce change, even in the
absence of litigation or in the anticipation thereof. Accordingly, many

244. See, e.g., John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargainingwith PrivateInformation,
31 J. ECON. LIT. 45, 50 (1993).
245. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for
Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REv. 119, 124 (1994) (noting the pre-litigation utility of
FOIA).
246. Cf Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of
Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1056 (2008) (describing information cascade
effects from initial FOIA disclosures).
247. See, e.g., Tomlinson, supra note 245, at 153-54 (describing the use of FOIA to
establish whether one has a legal claim).
248. Verified Second Amended Complaint-Class Action at
15(f), 19(d), 44
M.H. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., No. 1:08-cv-1435-BBM (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009).
249. Cummings & Rhode, supra note 12, at 639-42. See also id. at 651 (noting that
public interest organizations currently fail to "realize the full potential of pro bono support").
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litigators treat even the pre-filing process as an opportunity to settle.
This is consistent with Robert Ellickson's finding that those seeking to
"discipline deviants" in violation of social norms tend to engage first in
self-help and other informal countermeasures before moving to attorneyassisted claims. °
Ellickson identifies the mildest form of self-help as "truthful negative gossip" in which those seeking recourse sanction norms violators by
attacking their reputations in the community. 25 1 The pre-filing process in
which information is gathered may function as an opportunity to engage
in information sharing-in the form of newspaper articles, public education reports, op-ed pieces etc.-that serves the same purpose as truthful
negative gossip. These actions, which may fall short of a demand letter,
serve to put the potential defendants on notice, much as local gossip
warns cattlemen in Shasta County of possible future action. 2
Alternatively, observing an affirmative duty to gossip about remedial success when truthful negative gossip works is less frequently observed in modem reform litigation. Once a norms violator has rectified
the situation by stopping the rights violating practices, it is important that
reformers broadcast that information. As Ellickson notes, this is partly to
ensure that others do not continue to punish the violators once they have
stopped the offending behavior,253 but also to reintegrate the offenders
into the norm abiding community. Affirming gossip can be conducted in
conversations with reporters, for example, local and national policymakers, and particularly with other operators of comparable institutions.
B. Complaint
The complaint in today's institutional reform litigation is a powerful
shame-generating tool. The idea of the complaint as an opportunity for
story telling is not a new one, and litigators know that the most compelling cases rest upon the most compelling stories.254 But the complaint
can be made even more effective if reformers identify and use the public250. ELLICKSON, supra note 155, at 57.

251. Id.
252. Cf id. at 57-58 (describing the process by which the cattlemen of Shasta County use gossip against norms violators, in that case neighbors with unwieldy livestock or
neighbors with excessive debt owed to other community members, in order to tarnish
their reputations and hopefully encourage a change in behavior).
253. Id. at 232.
254. Cf Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil
Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 768-72 (1994) (advocating story telling in civil
rights complaints); Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 57, at 550 (same).
See also Lani Guinier, Supreme Court: 2007 Term: Foreword: Demosprudence Through'
Dissent, 122 HARv. L. REv. 4, 113 (2008) (urging lawyers to "weigh the demosprudential
possibilities of their case").
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ity audience and the norm community.255 Complaints as typically drafted
today, and those who offer advice on how to draft them, tend to treat
some combination of the judge, the general public, and the media as the
intended audience, leaving out the most critical audience of all: the defendants.256 Sympathetic judges make for terrific audiences, but reform
shaming is little needed in that context. Unsympathetic judges, who are
most likely to be alienated by the use of shaming in the complaint, are
also less likely to grant the requested relief. Thus, any potential tension
between norm entrepreneurship and litigation strategy appears minimal.
The second lesson offered by reform shaming is that the complaint
should be well versed in the language of social norms. It is of course a
legal document seeking relief from a court of law but, as a shaming document, it must also draw on the relationship between law and norms and
the recognition that the violation of norms may sometimes be more compelling than the violation of laws, particularly where the norm in question is a nearly universal one. Reformers must also recognize that the
specific norms to which they appeal in the complaint matter greatly to
the amount of shame, and accordingly leverage, generated. An appeal to
the due process rights of accused teenaged gang members is less compelling than one to the norm that children deserve special protections.
Universalizing the norm can also make the complaint less oppositional. The tendency for litigators is to characterize conflict as us versus
them, with "us" standing for truth, justice and the American way. One
possibility to consider, in at least certain litigation contexts, is pleading
that implies instead that there can be no other side to the case because the
norm violated is so universal, i.e., if defendants had known these norm
violations were occurring, they too would agree that action needs to be
taken.
C. Discovery
The leverage generated by litigation stems fundamentally from the
information that only litigation can procure, namely via the discovery
mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 57 The information
asymmetry in the absence of discovery often cannot be closed by FOIA
or equivalent requests alone, and operates almost exclusively in defend-

255. See infra Part III.A.
256. See, e.g., Lobel, Courts as Forumsfor Protest, supra note 57, at 551 (recom-

mending that litigators emphasize the richness of client stories so "the judge assigned to
the case is able to comprehend the plaintiffs full outrage, and, additionally, the media
and the public can understand the plaintiff's dramatic and compelling story").
257. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
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ants' favor. 25 8 The information generated by discovery includes material
plaintiffs may not have even suspected existed, material that may bolster
their cases, or even material essential to proving their claims. In the context of institutional reform litigation, this may include the institution's
official policies and procedures, training policies and practices, personnel
files, and official activity logs and budgets. Although attorneys, and not
the pubic, are the primary conduits of discovery material, institutional
defendants are often well aware of the perils of shameful material coming to light.
Reform shaming suggests ways in which this process can be leveraged to amplify the chances for change. It suggests that litigators review
discovery not just for material that tends to bolster a case for legal liability, but also for material that suggests the violation of a social norm. It
also suggests that once such material is discovered, subsequent discovery
should target the norm violation in addition to the legal violation. Finally, it advocates the use of discovery as an opportunity for thematic development in which the story of norm violation introduced by the complaint is expanded upon and emphasized. Where defendants refuse to
settle after the motion to dismiss, it is often that which is revealed during
discovery that compels settlement prior to trial-information that, simply
put, makes defendants look bad.
In terms of concrete application, one might imagine in a case involving the rights of juveniles in which deposition questions would underscore that employees were aware of plaintiffs' status as minors, that
discovery requests refer to plaintiffs not just as plaintiffs but also as children, and that discovery regarding injuries suffered touch upon any injuries particular to or exacerbated by the fact that plaintiffs are minors.
Similar lines of inquiry and thematic development may be envisioned for
other types of plaintiffs, such as the mentally impaired or the elderly. In
each instance, discovery may be used to underscore and give texture to
the idea that plaintiffs are vulnerable and that a social norm that they be
protected has been violated.
D. Settlement
As institutional reformers are well aware, the vast majority of reform litigation results in negotiated settlement.259 Indeed, one of the explicit goals of reform shaming is to drive settlements containing terms
more favorable to reform and occurring earlier in the life of a case. Successful implementation of reform shaming can help to overcome many of
258. See, e.g., Tomlinson, supranote 245, at 123 (noting that "FOIA is no substitute for pretrial discovery... ").
259. Chiang, supra note 12, at 581.
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the traditional psychological barriers to settlement, such as thinking according to a win-lose mentality, attributing more extreme and homogenous views to one's opponents than they actually hold, applying selfserving notions of fairness, believing that one's opponents are being intransigent, and exaggerating the difference between belief systems.260
Reform shaming underscores the importance of shared social norms
and presents an opportunity for defendants to share the moral high
ground via settlement. The shame dynamic's impact on public and
shareholder perception further incentives settlement even in the absence
of moral consonance, where settlement is driven purely by the rationally
self-interested desire to protect profit-one might even conceive of reform shaming as adding a functional damages multiplier.2 6' Even where
settlement is in actuality rent-seeking behavior masquerading as social
norm acceptance, the outward acceptance results in nearly identical positive externalities. It is also worth noting that even such settlements will
likely produce commitment bias, wherein people will generally go to
great lengths to uphold commitments they have made.262 Notably, these
effects are amplified by both public and written commitments, even
when the person making the commitment does not initially intend to uphold it.
In order for these benefits to accrue, however, reform litigators must
themselves beware of the psychological barriers to settlement, which, not
coincidentally, are also barriers to post-shaming reintegration. In other
words, treating defendants as enemy combatants rather than fellow
members of a shared culture with shared norms is not only counterproductive to settlement but also to any meaningful long-term reform. The
path to settlement is paved with the language of reintegration, even before the parties enter into official negotiations.
CONCLUSION

The story of law reform has been told a number of times, with different casts of characters, heroes, and morals. This Article has focused
on the part played by institutional reform litigation, with an eye to developing and strengthening its role with the use of reform shaming. It argues that meaningful change arises only out of shared social norms and
that litigation that leverages this essential fact is litigation that can result
in substantive reform. Although this Article has drawn upon the literature of new governance, social science, behavioral economics, and cause
260. See, e.g., Seul, supra note 86, at 908-12 (summarizing psychological literature).

261. Cf id. at 886 (describing motivations for settlement).
262. Woods, supra note 159, at 67.
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lawyering, the narrative it constructs rests primarily upon an understanding of the importance of shared values in civil society. It is, in many
ways, an optimistic account of human relations, one in which our continued growth and development as a people hinges largely on the identification and reinforcement of commonality.

